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The Tower of Babel by Pieter Bruegel the Elder: a vast unfinished spiral tower rising over a harbour city.
Pieter Bruegel the Elder, The Tower of Babel, 1563. Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna.
Dispatch · I.FL.INTR.01

The End of the Multipolar Myth

2 November 2026 · 18 min read

The unipolar moment is over — though American power is not. The multipolar order meant to replace it was never real. What lies between them has no name yet, and no author — and that is the point.

The Moment That Felt Like Forever

In the winter of 1990, in the pages of Foreign Affairs, Charles Krauthammer gave the age its name. The Cold War’s bipolar world was dead; the United States stood alone, the one first-rate power with no rival in sight. He called it the unipolar moment, and the phrase has outlived nearly everything else written about that decade.

It is worth recovering what he actually argued, because the culture kept only half of it. Krauthammer did not predict that American primacy would last forever — the opposite. He called it a moment because he expected it to pass: in another generation or so, great powers coequal with the United States would emerge, and the world would come to resemble the era before the First World War. He took the arrival of multipolarity for granted. What he doubted was its imminence, not its inevitability.

Two other things he said were forgotten almost at once, and they matter more today than the headline did. The first: that the notion of economic giants like Japan and Germany automatically maturing into geopolitical poles was, in his phrase, a materialist illusion — weight on a balance sheet does not convert, by itself, into weight on a map. The second, and more startling: that the real alternative to American unipolarity was not a stable multipolar order at all. The alternative to unipolarity, he wrote flatly, is chaos. Not a concert of balanced powers. Disorder.

The culture kept neither caution. What lodged in the public mind was the triumphalist version — the unipolar moment as a permanent condition, fused with the decade’s other great announcement, that history had reached its terminus and the terminus looked like Washington. The American model was no longer one option among several; it was the endpoint of all civilizations. Adversaries were “not yet” democratic, the way a child is “not yet” an adult. “The international community” could be spoken without irony, because there was, briefly, a center confident enough to speak for it.

That structure of feeling has now collapsed, and the collapse is the thing to be precise about. It is not that American power has evaporated: the United States still spends roughly a third of the world’s military budget to China’s one-eighth; still posts the larger economy at market prices — though already the smaller once output is measured by purchasing power, the materialist illusion cutting the other way — and still commands the financial chokepoints through which coercion runs. What has ended is narrower and more consequential than any balance sheet: the uncontested center that others took as the world’s destination. In its place, nearly everyone reaches for the very word Krauthammer also predicted — multipolarity. To see why the forecast fails, ask the question the prediction never asks: where do international orders come from in the first place?

Section I · The Forces – Fault Lines

Primacy has no single measure.
United States and China, four measures — each on its own basis.
MeasureUnited StatesChina
Military spending share of world · 202533%12%
GDP, market prices 2026$32.4tn$20.9tn
GDP, purchasing power share of world · 202614.5%19.9%
Cross-border payments SWIFT · 202548%3%
On one basis of four — output at purchasing power — the challenger leads. SIPRI 2025; IMF WEO 2026; SWIFT 2025. · Exhibit 01 · I.FL.INTR.01
Section I · The Forces – Fault Lines

The crossover already happened.
Share of world GDP at purchasing power, %, 2000–2026.
0%5%10%15%20%25%200020052010201620202026United StatesChina
China passed the United States in the mid-2010s. IMF World Economic Outlook (PPPSH), 2026. · Exhibit 02 · I.FL.INTR.01

Orders Are Founded, Not Only Grown

Here is the fact the multipolarity debate skips. International orders do not simply emerge; they do not condense out of a distribution of power the way fog settles. The orders the modern world remembers were founded — at a datable moment, by identifiable authors. Vienna, 1815: a generation of Napoleonic war ended with the victors around a table, writing the rules of a concert that bought Europe its longest respite from general war. San Francisco and Bretton Woods, 1944–45: out of the largest catastrophe in history, an order of institutions, currencies, and norms, negotiated by named delegates, signed, headquartered, named. The founders of 1945 wrote their hierarchy into the text, correcting the League’s error of treating all states as equal by handing five powers a permanent veto. Authorship here is not a metaphor. It is a signature.

Section I · The Forces – Fault Lines

Every order was founded.
The modern settlements, and the gap after the last one.
1648
Westphalia
contested
1815
Vienna
1945
Bretton Woods
1990
The unipolar moment
Now
The interregnum
no author
Westphalia’s founding is itself contested (Osiander). · Exhibit 03 · I.FL.INTR.01

A founding of this kind turns on two things and is usually occasioned by a third. The indispensable two are an author — a power, or a small club of powers, with both the strength to impose a settlement and the standing to make it stick — and a shared grammar: not agreement on interests, which always diverge, but a working minimum of common vocabulary among the authors about what counts as legitimate rule. The third, a rupture — a catastrophe that discredits the old order — is the usual trigger, not a law; what a founding cannot do without is the author and the grammar. This keeps the argument that follows empirical rather than definitional. The claim is not that no catastrophe has lately occurred; it is that no one is doing the writing. A founding in progress would be visible — a named power winning a critical mass of others to a new grammar of legitimate rule. If a bloc on the order of BRICS+ produced a binding rulebook that a majority of the world’s middle powers accepted as legitimate, that would be a founding, catastrophe or none. It is not happening. The absence is observed, not stipulated.

Section I · The Forces – Fault Lines

An order needs an author.
The founding test, applied to four settlements.
SettlementAuthorShared grammarFounding
Vienna, 1815YesYesYes
Bretton Woods & the UN, 1944–45YesYesYes
Westphalia, 1648ContestedNarrated afterContested
The presentNoneNoneNo
The test: an author, and a shared grammar among the authors. Two pass; the present does not. · Exhibit 04 · I.FL.INTR.01

Two honest concessions, both of which sharpen the point. The first: order is not only founded. The English School is right that international society also grows — thickening between the great settlements through the daily practice of diplomacy, law, and recognition. But growth of that kind elaborates an order that already exists; it does not, by itself, produce a new ordering principle to replace one that is dying. You can cultivate a garden; you cannot grow your way from an empty field to a constitution. The second cuts harder. The most cited founding of all — Westphalia, 1648, taught as the birth of sovereignty — is regarded by many historians, Andreas Osiander among them, as a story told later, the sovereign-state order read back into the treaties by scholars who needed an origin myth. That case genuinely troubles any strong version of the thesis: if 1648 was narrated into a founding only afterward, it is evidence for “grown,” not against it. So the strong version should be dropped. The defensible claim is narrower and sufficient: some cardinal orders — 1815, 1945 — were authored in datable windows; authored founding is one important way orders begin, and it is the way a post-unipolar world would have to begin, because growth alone cannot generate a successor principle to one that is ending.

The point is not new, and its sharpest statement comes, with some irony, from the prophet of unipolarity himself. Krauthammer insisted that international stability is never a given and never the norm — that when it exists, it is the product of self-conscious action by the great powers. Later scholarship sharpened the claim: Ikenberry’s “constitutional moments,” the narrow windows after major wars when a victor locks in a durable order before its power fades, and Ruggie’s “embedded liberalism,” the negotiated postwar bargain between open trade and social protection, are both accounts of order authored, not grown. Even the long calm of the nineteenth century, Krauthammer noted, was the work of Britain’s exertions on behalf of the balance. The Concert of Europe was made, not grown.

The Myth of Multipolarity

The coming “multipolar world” fails the test on three layers.

The first is historical. The forecast leans, always, on a single precedent — the one Krauthammer himself reached for: nineteenth-century Europe, the balance of powers, the century between Vienna and Sarajevo. Two things are wrong with the analogy. That system was not a multipolar world order but a concert of five powers of the same civilization — sharing a religion in broad outline, a diplomatic language, intermarried dynasties, and a common understanding of what the game was and who could play it. The rest of the planet was not a participant; it was the prize, and the balance among the five was kept, in no small part, by exporting their rivalry into the partition of everyone else. And the “century of peace” is a Eurocentric compression: more than a dozen major interstate wars were fought on the continent, the Crimean War alone costing on the order of half a million lives, the wars of Italian and German unification remaking the map by force — before one counts the colonial violence the tally leaves out. The one canonical case of multipolar order was a members-only club with a shared grammar and an external dumping ground for its frictions — precisely the conditions absent among today’s supposed poles.

The second layer is conceptual, and load-bearing. Krauthammer called the belief that economic heft becomes geopolitical power a materialist illusion; the illusion runs deeper than he allowed. The forecast confuses a distribution of power with an order of power. That several states are strong tells you how capability is spread; it tells you nothing about whether rules exist. Poles are not an order any more than several masses are a solar system — what makes a system is the regularity that binds the bodies, not the bodies themselves. Multipolarity smuggles the binding in for free, assuming that once power is distributed, balance will somehow be agreed, recognized, institutionalized. But balance is a founded arrangement. Strip the assumption out and “multipolarity” deflates into a banality: several states are powerful. True, and orderless.

The third layer is political, and the most revealing. Listen to who says the word. “Multipolarity” is the official vocabulary of the challengers. It is written into Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, which casts Moscow as a builder of “a multipolar international system” and names the end of American dominance as an explicit aim; it recurs in Xi Jinping’s set-piece diplomacy and Wang Yi’s call for an “equal and orderly multipolar world.” In each case the word means the end of your centrality, never the limitation of ours. No power demanding a multipolar world has volunteered the ceiling on its own ambitions a genuine one would require. The word is not a blueprint; it is a crowbar — an instrument for prying the old order apart, discarded the moment the prying is done. Krauthammer caught the same move in its infancy: the multilateral theater of 1990, a dominant power acting alone while recruiting a ship here and a brigade there to lend its actions a borrowed legitimacy, he called pseudo-multilateralism. What we have now is its successor one turn of the screw on — pseudo-multipolarity, a disorder dressed in the costume of an emerging balance.

Section I · The Forces – Fault Lines

Multipolarity is the challengers’ word.
Who uses which vocabulary for the order to come.
ActorVocabularySource
Russia“a multipolar system”Foreign Policy Concept, 2023
China“an equal and orderly multipolar world”Xi; Wang Yi, 2023–2025
BRICS“multilateralism”Kazan Declaration, 2024
United States“a balance of power”National Security Strategy, 2025
Each demands the end of another’s centrality, never a limit on its own. · Exhibit 05 · I.FL.INTR.01

The Interregnum

Writing from a fascist prison, Antonio Gramsci described an age between orders: the old is dying, the new cannot yet be born, and in the interval — in his translators’ English — a great variety of morbid symptoms appears. (The line now travels as “now is the time of monsters.” That version is not his; the monsters were added by Slavoj Žižek and others. The original word is symptoms, and it is the better one.) The word interregnum must be handled with care, because it carries a promise — an inter-regnum, a gap between one reign and the next, with a next assumed. That promise should be held at arm’s length. What follows may be a passage to a new order or a condition that lasts; we cannot yet tell which, and the honest frame commits to neither.

What can be said is what the interval contains, and it does not add up to a system. The institutions of the unipolar moment still stand but no longer bind; they are attended rather than obeyed. Reserve currencies are hedged against without being replaced. Alliances once called values-based are renegotiated as transactions. New blocs enlarge without cohering. Regional wars burn for years with no referee. The plumbing of interdependence — payment systems, supply chains, chokepoints — is quietly rewired into a weapon; and it is here that American power most visibly persists. Close to half of the world’s tracked payments still clear in dollars, against the renminbi’s roughly three percent, and Washington runs coercion through that plumbing — sanctions, export controls, the clearing system — with rising frequency. But notice what that power is. It is the power to deny and to punish, to police the wiring of a system; it is not the power to found a new one. A hegemon reduced to weaponizing the chokepoints of an order it can no longer lead is not maintaining that order. It is policing a vacuum. The reflex reads each of these as a brick in the foundation of a coming order. The founding test says otherwise: nothing is being founded — no author holds the pen, no grammar is shared. These are symptoms; and disorder, Krauthammer saw, is what the absence of a leading hand produces. His point was prescriptive — his cure was more American primacy, not less — and he was wrong to assume the only alternatives were primacy or collapse. But on the narrower forecast he was right, against his own preference: the successor to unipolarity is not a stable multipolar order. It is this.

Section I · The Forces – Fault Lines

The dollar is hedged, not replaced.
Share of cross-border payments, SWIFT, 2025.
US dollar
48%
Euro
23%
Renminbi
3%
Hedging at the margin is not replacement. SWIFT, 2025. · Exhibit 06 · I.FL.INTR.01

That leaves the question of why the interval holds — why no one writes the next order. The intuitive answer blames a collision. The truer answer is stranger.

The Empty Chair

The seductive way to explain the deadlock is a clash of two universalisms — the missionary and the mandarin. America the missionary: heir to Manifest Destiny, to the “indispensable nation,” to the creed that the world is unfinished until it converts to the American model. China the mandarin: heir to Tiāncháo, the Middle Kingdom around which the world arranges itself, others approaching by deference rather than imitation. On this story the interregnum persists because two civilizations, each certain it is the natural center, cannot both be accommodated. It is elegant, and too clean — and the ways it fails matter more than the story.

Take the American side, where the failure is sharpest. The missionary strand is real and old; it ran through the rhetoric of every administration from the Cold War’s end to the near present. But realists have long argued — Mearsheimer, Walt, Layne — that the missionary language was always partly a gloss on ordinary power politics, cover rather than cause. And the current administration has set the strand down in its own founding document: the 2025 National Security Strategy rejects the “ill-fated concept of global domination” in favor of “global and regional balances of power.” Read only that and it looks like abdication. But the same document is no renunciation of primacy: it claims “military overmatch,” insists on precedence in its own hemisphere, reserves the right to deny any rival regional dominance. This is not a power leaving the field; it is a power that has swapped one grammar for another — primacy asserted in the language of spheres rather than of conversion. The honest description is not that America has abdicated but that its authorial claim is in visible flux: it has stopped offering a grammar others might sign, without yet coining one to replace it.

The mandarin side fails more quietly. Beijing’s official vocabulary is relentlessly egalitarian — “an equal and orderly multipolar world,” “sovereign equality,” a “community of common destiny.” Nowhere in the white papers does China name itself the center. The concentric reading is an inference drawn from outside, by critics like William Callahan, who note that China names, brands, and sequences its own succession of global initiatives — convenor, not participant — and hear in “great rejuvenation” a claim to return to the center of civilization. It is an inference about behavior, not a proclamation in any text, and it is contested inside China’s own realist establishment: Yan Xuetong rejects the tianxia template as empirically hollow. So the honest claim is not that China proclaims centrality. It is that China acts as an agenda-setter whose centrality it will not state and cannot get accepted — including within its own strategic establishment.

Set the two failures side by side. They do not describe two confident universalisms colliding; they describe an authoring role neither will occupy on terms the other could sign. One has stopped offering a grammar; the other cannot get its own accepted. But this invites the obvious objection, and it deserves an answer rather than a definition: perhaps a successor order is already forming — just not the kind with a single author. Two candidates must be met head-on.

The first is the multiplex world of Amitav Acharya: a decentered order of many actors, regional institutions, and cross-cutting norms, no one at the head of the table. The reply is not that this is impossible but that it is not an order in the sense the argument uses — and it is worth being open that this is a choice about what “order” means, not a neutral finding. A multiplex arrangement has coordination; it lacks a binding grammar its members recognize as authoritative over them. Regional bodies that do not concede one another’s supremacy, norms no one can enforce against a great power, coexistence without a common rule of legitimacy: that is a plural condition, and it may well be durable, but a crowd is not a constitution. To call it an order is to relabel the absence of one.

The second candidate is more concrete, and the American turn invites it: a tacit modus vivendi of spheres. Perhaps the three great powers are quietly authoring a grammar after all — each supreme in its own region, the hemisphere for Washington, the near-abroad for Moscow, the near-seas for Beijing — settled by convergence rather than conference. If that were happening, it would be a founding, and this argument would be wrong. It is not happening, and the test is empirical, not definitional. A grammar of spheres would require the powers to have agreed the borders. They have not. Ukraine, Taiwan, and the hemisphere are precisely the lines that are contested, not conceded — spheres claimed unilaterally and refused mutually, the opposite of a settlement. The day those borders are agreed rather than fought over, there will be a founding to analyze. Today there is a collision of claims, which is a symptom, not a constitution.

Section I · The Forces – Fault Lines

No one will hold the pen.
What would count as authoring the next order, and what is observed.
CandidateWhat would countWhat is observedVerdict
United StatesA signable grammarSpheres, no signable ruleNot authoring
ChinaAssent to a centreEgalitarian words, unacceptedPositioning
MultiplexA binding shared grammarCoordination onlyNot an order
Tacit spheresAgreed bordersContested, not agreedNot yet
The one dated test: the day the borders are agreed, there is a founding. · Exhibit 07 · I.FL.INTR.01

This is also the right way to hold the analogy everyone reaches for — the Thucydides Trap. As a trans-historical law it is contested; classicists dispute whether Thucydides claimed any such thing, and the framework’s own compilers disclaim iron laws. Take it as a lens, and study the cases that escaped war. Each required someone to accept a limited role, and the cleanest — Britain’s accommodation of a rising United States a century ago — worked because the successor was a kindred power the incumbent could imagine handing the keys to. That condition is absent between Washington and Beijing. But the present decade adds a twist the trap never anticipated. The ruling power is not gripping the keys; it is setting them down. The rising power is not reaching for them. The trap imagines two hands fighting over a pen. The interregnum shows a pen that neither hand will pick up.

Here, then, is the argument entire. The unipolar moment is over — not because American power has collapsed, but because the thing that defined it is gone: the uncontested center others took as the world’s destination. The multipolar order meant to replace it is a myth — historically singular and misread, conceptually confused, politically weaponized, and, on the present evidence, authored by no one. What sits between the dead moment and the absent order is best called an interregnum, with one caveat entered honestly: the word promises a successor, and no such promise is in evidence. Whether this is a passage to a new order or a durable condition of its own, the argument cannot say and does not pretend to. What it can say is smaller and firmer — that right now no one is writing the next order, and much of what is read as its early architecture is the old one being taken apart for parts.

Reading the Interregnum

A frame is worth keeping only for what it lets you see. Carry this one to the next headline and it resolves into three questions.

First: is this a symptom or a founding? Ask for the author and the grammar. A summit, a bloc, a currency arrangement, a declared doctrine — is a named power winning a critical mass of others to a new rule of legitimacy, or not? If not — and it will almost always be not — you are looking at a morbid symptom dressed as architecture. The reflex reads every development as the first brick of what comes next. The discipline is to ask whether anyone is laying bricks at all, or whether the old wall is simply shedding them.

Second: when you hear “multipolarity,” ask what work the word is doing. Is the speaker proposing a limit on their own centrality, or only on someone else’s? The answer identifies the crowbar — and tells you that what is demanded is not a new order but a better position in the disorder.

Third: watch less for the collision of centers than for the chair no one will sit in. The danger of the old world lay at the point of greatest friction between two rival centers. The danger of this one lies in the vacancy — the seat of authorship sitting empty while the machinery of the last order is turned, piece by piece, into a weapon.

The temptation of an interregnum is to treat it as a waiting room — to assume a finished order lies beyond it, and that our task is to guess its shape. The harder possibility is that the waiting room may be the building. Krauthammer expected the moment to give way to a multipolar world; it has given way instead to a disorder of the kind he named as the only alternative — though he wanted it answered with more American primacy, not accepted as a condition. The unipolar moment taught us to expect a destination; the multipolar myth lets us keep expecting one. Learning to live without that expectation — to tell a symptom from a foundation, a crowbar from a blueprint, an empty chair from a contested one — is the first literacy of the age that is actually arriving. The old world had a center. The mythical one has several. The real one, for as far ahead as honesty permits us to see, has none — and, stranger and more dangerous, no one willing to build it one.

Read through the Method
Context
Thirty years after the unipolar moment, the vocabulary of a “multipolar world” has become the default of chancelleries and op-eds alike.
Causes
Only two economies fund two navies able to project force on every ocean; everyone else borrows one of the two umbrellas.
Actors
Washington and Beijing; the middle powers — India, the Gulf, Brazil, the EU — who hedge, not balance.
Perspectives
From Delhi multipolarity is a hope; from Brussels a programme; from Beijing a slogan for the interval before parity.
Relationships
Links The Reserve (I) and Dry Powder (II): the dollar and the yuan are the two poles that the carriers defend.

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