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Thu 19 Nov 2026
The Knesset building in Jerusalem seen from the south, a low colonnaded block on a hill above trees, with no people in view.
The Knesset building, Jerusalem, seen from the south. Photograph by Beny Shlevich, 2007. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0.
Dispatch · I.FL.CONT.01

Israel’s Arab Parties Are One of Three Roads to Power

In the Knesset elected on 27 October 2026, the Arab-led parties Ra'am and the Joint List hold 19 of 120 seats, the most they have ever held, and both have recommended Gadi Eisenkot for prime minister. Their votes are one of three arithmetic routes to a governing majority; the other two require parties to cross the line between the blocs in which they campaigned. The challenge to the result has been aimed at the Arab vote, and the Central Elections Committee certified the count after finding no irregularities that affected it.

10 November 2026 · 16 min read

In the Knesset elected on 27 October 2026, the Arab-led parties Ra’am and the Joint List hold 19 of 120 seats, the most they have ever held, and both have recommended Gadi Eisenkot for prime minister. Their votes are one of three arithmetic routes to a governing majority; the other two require parties to cross the line between the blocs in which they campaigned. The challenge to the result has been aimed at the Arab vote, and the Central Elections Committee certified the count after finding no irregularities that affected it.

On 4 November 2026 Israel’s Central Elections Committee certified the election of 27 October to the 26th Knesset. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc won 53 of 120 seats, the four parties led by Gadi Eisenkot 48, and the Arab-led parties Ra’am and the Joint List 19, almost double their 10 in the outgoing Knesset.12 Neither bloc reached 61. Members holding 67 seats recommended Eisenkot to President Isaac Herzog and members holding 46 recommended Netanyahu; on 8 November Herzog assigned Eisenkot the task of forming a government.34

The Knesset elected on 27 October gives the Arab-led parties more weight in forming a government than they have held at any point since the state’s founding. Their 19 seats are one of three arithmetic routes to a governing majority, and the only one that adds seats from outside both campaign blocs instead of moving a party from one bloc to the other. The effort to contest the result has been directed at their votes in particular.

The working assumption behind this Dispatch was stronger: that no government could be formed without the Arab-led parties or a Netanyahu–Eisenkot arrangement. Three tests decide how much of it survives.

  • Arithmetic. With the certified seats, no coalition of 61 exists without an Arab-led party or a Netanyahu–Eisenkot arrangement. It fails if any other route to 61 exists.
  • Novelty. Arab-led parties were part of the governing majority in 1992, from outside, and in 2021, inside the coalition. Unless 2026 differs from both in structure, the claim narrows to record weight.
  • Legitimacy. The fraud and foreign-influence claims made after the vote targeted the Arab-led vote specifically. It fails if the claims were general, or if sources do not establish who made them and how the committee answered.

The first test failed in that form, and the thesis above is the narrower claim that survives it. The second narrows the claim to weight. The third passes.

The certified count

The final count, published by the committee in the early hours of 30 October and certified on 4 November, gave seats to eleven lists. Turnout was 77.9 per cent of eligible voters, the highest in decades, with 5,716,665 votes cast. The electoral threshold of 3.25 per cent excluded three lists, among them the Reservists list led by Yoaz Hendel, which received 2.63 per cent.1 The committee’s certification left the bloc totals of 53, 48 and 19 unchanged.2

I · THE FORCES — FAULT LINES

The Arab-led parties won 19 seats and neither campaign bloc reached 61.
Seats in the 26th Knesset by list and campaign bloc, election of 27 October 2026, with the 2022 election for comparison
ListCampaign blocSeats 2026
LikudNetanyahu27
United Torah JudaismNetanyahu7
Otzma YehuditNetanyahu7
ShasNetanyahu6
Religious Zionism (joint list with Zehut)Netanyahu6
Yashar (Eisenkot)Eisenkot21
B’Yachad (Bennett, Lapid)Eisenkot12
The Democrats (Golan)Eisenkot8
Yisrael Beytenu (Liberman)Eisenkot7
Joint ListArab-led11
Ra’amArab-led8
Netanyahu bloc53 (2022: 64)
Eisenkot bloc48 (2022: 46)
Arab-led parties19 (2022: 10)
Total120
Source: Central Elections Committee final count as reported by The Times of Israel, 30 October 2026; certification as reported by Al Jazeera, 4 November 2026; 2022 official seats as reported by Arutz Sheva, 9 November 2022. The 2022 comparison is computed by Titanica by grouping the 2022 lists by camp: Likud, Religious Zionism, Shas and United Torah Judaism (64); Yesh Atid, National Unity, Yisrael Beytenu and Labor (46); Ra’am and Hadash–Ta’al (10). Several lists have merged or split since 2022, so only bloc totals are compared. · Exhibit 01 · I.FL.CONT.01

Three features of the count carry the rest of the argument. The Netanyahu bloc lost 11 seats against its 2022 result of 64, and is eight seats short of a majority.5 The Eisenkot bloc is 13 seats short. The Arab-led parties’ 19 seats exceed both shortfalls. Religious Zionism ran on a joint list with Moshe Feiglin’s Zehut.6

The recommendations to the President followed the same lines, with one exception. Shas, Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionism and Likud recommended Netanyahu, for a total of 46. United Torah Judaism recommended no one: Degel HaTorah, which holds four of its seven seats, broke with Netanyahu over his coalition’s failure to pass legislation exempting Haredi men from military service.78 The four parties of the Eisenkot bloc and both Arab-led parties recommended Eisenkot, for a total of 67.38

Nineteen seats in a longer series

The second test asks whether the Arab-led parties’ place in the arithmetic is new. Twice before, their seats were part of the majority that installed or sustained a government.

In 1992 Labor won 44 seats and Meretz 12, a total of 56. Hadash, with 3 seats, and the Arab Democratic Party, with 2, stayed outside the coalition and agreed to block any attempt by the right to bring the government down, on condition that it pursued negotiations with the Palestinians and advanced equality for Arab citizens. When Shas left the coalition in September 1993, the government of Yitzhak Rabin held 56 seats and depended on the five Arab members for its survival in no-confidence votes.9 In 2021 Ra’am, with four seats, became the first Arab party to join an Israeli governing coalition, within a government of 61 seats led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid.1011 The Knesset approved that government on 13 June 2021 by 60 votes to 59; one Ra’am member abstained.10

In both cases, then, the arithmetic of government already depended on Arab-led parties. Measured by structure, 2026 is not the first time. Measured by size, it is a break with the series.

I · THE FORCES — FAULT LINES

The Arab-led parties’ 2026 total exceeds their previous high by four seats.
Seats won by Arab-led lists and estimated turnout in Arab localities, selected Knesset elections, 1992–2026
ElectionArab-led seatsArab turnoutRole in government formation
19925 (Hadash 3, Arab Democratic Party 2)n/aOutside support; part of the 61-seat blocking majority
201513 (Joint List)63.5%n/a
April 201910 (Hadash–Ta’al 6, Ra’am–Balad 4)49.2%n/a
September 201913 (Joint List)59.2%n/a
202015 (Joint List)64.8%n/a
202110 (Ra’am 4, Joint List 6)44.6%Ra’am inside a 61-seat coalition
202210 (Ra’am 5, Hadash–Ta’al 5)53.2%n/a
202619 (Joint List 11, Ra’am 8)about 77% (estimate)Both recommended the candidate assigned the mandate
Source: seats for 1992 from +972 Magazine, 31 October 2015; 2015–2020 from Israel Democracy Institute analyses by Arik Rudnitzky (April 2019, September 2019, March 2020); 2021 from Ynet, 27 October 2026; 2022 from the Israel Democracy Institute, 25 December 2022; 2026 from the Central Elections Committee via The Times of Israel, 30 October 2026. Turnout 2015–2022: Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 1661, 20 November 2022 (the IDI gives 63.4% for 2015). Turnout 2026: Israel Democracy Institute estimate as reported by Jewish News, 5 November 2026; not an official figure. No source opened for this Dispatch gives a 1992 figure on the same basis. · Exhibit 02 · I.FL.CONT.01

The series shows the scale of the change. Between 2015 and 2022 the Arab-led parties held between 10 and 15 seats, and their turnout ranged between 44.6 and 64.8 per cent.121314151617 The 2026 result of 19 seats is four above the previous high of 15, reached by the united Joint List in 2020.14 On election day, Channel 12 put Arab turnout at about 80 per cent; the Israel Democracy Institute’s estimate, reported after the count, was about 77 per cent, against 53.2 per cent in 2022.1819 Locality figures published by Ynet at 8 p.m. on election day already showed the shift: turnout in Umm al-Fahm stood at 70.1 per cent, against 38.3 per cent in 2022, and in Rahat at 79.8 per cent, against 60.6 per cent.15

The comparison with 1992 and 2021 also shows what changed in kind. In both earlier cases the Arab-led seats were the last seats of a majority: five added to 56 in 1992, four added to 57 in 2021. In 2026 the Arab-led parties hold more seats than either bloc needs to reach 61, which gives them a role in more than one possible government. The second test therefore narrows the claim. The novelty lies in weight, and the thesis is stated in those terms.

Three roads to sixty-one

The first test is arithmetic, and it can be settled by counting. Titanica enumerated every combination of the eleven lists. Of the 2,047 possible combinations, 1,000 reach at least 61 seats. Forty-six of those contain neither Arab-led party and do not combine Likud with Yashar. The test in its original form therefore fails: a majority without the Arab-led parties and without a Netanyahu–Eisenkot partnership exists on paper.

Every one of those 46 combinations, however, requires at least one party to cross the line between the blocs in which it campaigned. The routes reduce to three.

I · THE FORCES — FAULT LINES

Every majority requires the Arab-led parties or a party that crosses a bloc line.
Routes to 61 seats under the certified results of 27 October 2026, with the declared positions of the parties concerned
RouteExample combinationSeatsArab-led votes neededDeclared position on record
1. Eisenkot bloc with Arab-led supportEisenkot bloc 48 + Joint List 11 + Ra’am 867YesBoth Arab-led parties recommended Eisenkot; the Joint List offers outside support, Ra’am is willing to join; Liberman said before the vote he would support no minority government
2. Eisenkot bloc with the Haredi partiesEisenkot bloc 48 + United Torah Judaism 7 + Shas 661NoShas recommended Netanyahu; UTJ recommended no one; Liberman has called for talks with the Haredi community
3a. Likud with Eisenkot’s campNetanyahu bloc 53 + Yashar 2174NoNetanyahu has called for a national unity government; Eisenkot has rejected serving under Netanyahu, including in a rotation
3b. Netanyahu bloc with one opposition listNetanyahu bloc 53 + B’Yachad 12, or + The Democrats 865 or 61NoThe opposition leaders have ruled out joining a Netanyahu-led coalition
Arithmetic onlyNetanyahu bloc 53 + Ra’am 861YesProposed by no party in the sources reviewed
Source: seats from the Central Elections Committee via The Times of Israel, 30 October 2026. Combinations computed by Titanica from the certified seats (2,047 combinations of 11 lists; 1,000 reach 61). Positions from Al Jazeera, 3, 5 and 7 November 2026; Ynet, 15 October 2026; The Jerusalem Post, 28 October 2026; To Vima, 6 November 2026; the Associated Press, 7 November 2026. · Exhibit 03 · I.FL.CONT.01

The first route is the one the Arab-led parties have offered. The Joint List recommended Eisenkot unanimously, saying it was answering a “public demand” to prevent Netanyahu’s return, and has ruled out joining his government while offering to help install it from outside. Ra’am has said it is willing to join.8 During the campaign Joint List leader Yousef Jabareen said his party could not join an Eisenkot-led government and might support one from outside; Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas said after the vote, “I believe we can overcome the difficulties,” and that most voters for the Eisenkot bloc “do want to see a government with the Ra’am party.”20 On election night Ta’al’s leader Ahmad Tibi said: “We are extending a hand and are ready to help.”21

Eisenkot ruled out a government with the Arab-led parties during the campaign.20 After the vote he set four principles for any party in his government, which the leaders of his bloc endorsed on 3 November: recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, adherence to the Declaration of Independence, universal national or military service, and the dismantling of Hamas’s military and political wings.224 Abbas supports disarming Hamas and has declined to describe it as a terrorist organisation.8 In remarks reported by Ynet on 6 November, Eisenkot described a plan to “swear in a government as quickly as possible”, built on the four parties of his bloc with outside support from Arab and Haredi parties.23

Within his own bloc the first route has one open supporter. The Democrats’ leader Yair Golan has called the exclusion of the Arab-led parties racist.22 Avigdor Liberman, whose seven seats are part of the 48, said on 15 October: “We will not support any minority government, not even a temporary minority government.”24 The Associated Press reported on 7 November that other members of Eisenkot’s bloc had said they would reject a minority government backed by Arab parties from outside the coalition.25

The second route needs every Haredi seat. With the 48 seats of the Eisenkot bloc, United Torah Judaism’s 7 and Shas’s 6 make exactly 61.26 Liberman, who had made Haredi military service a condition of his politics, shifted after the election to calling for talks with the Haredi community, and the UTJ legislator Yaakov Asher said the party’s rabbis would review any formal proposal.26 Shas recommended Netanyahu.7 The route requires both Haredi parties to leave the bloc in which they campaigned, and a single absent seat would take it below 61.

The third route requires Likud and the Eisenkot camp to govern together, or one of Eisenkot’s partners to join Netanyahu. In a video statement reported by the Associated Press on 7 November, Netanyahu called for a “national unity government” and warned against “hastily swearing in a government with terrorist supporters”, a phrase that, according to the Associated Press, he uses for the Arab-led parties.25 Eisenkot has rejected serving under Netanyahu, including in a rotation, and the other opposition leaders have ruled out joining a coalition he leads.21

The first test, restated, passes. Every route to 61 under the certified results requires either the Arab-led parties or a party that leaves the bloc in which it campaigned, and each requires at least one party to act against a position it has stated on the record, in the sources reviewed.

What a confidence vote requires

Sixty-one seats are the conventional measure of a majority, but the law that installs a government asks for less. Basic Law: The Government provides that a new government takes office when “the Knesset has expressed confidence in it”.27 It sets no minimum number of votes for that act. The 2021 government took office with 60 votes in favour and 59 against.10 The 61-vote threshold applies to the removal of a government: an expression of no confidence is a decision of a majority of the Knesset’s members to ask the President to charge a named member with forming a new government.27

This distinction is what makes a minority government possible, and it changes what the Arab-led parties need to do. Support from outside the coalition, abstention, or a vote in favour all count differently.

I · THE FORCES — FAULT LINES

A 48-seat government passes only with Arab-led votes in favour or Haredi members not voting against.
Illustrative confidence votes for a government of the four Eisenkot-bloc parties (48 seats), 26th Knesset
ScenarioForAgainstAbstainOutcome
A. Both Arab-led parties vote for67530Passes
B. Ra’am votes for, Joint List abstains565311Passes
C. Joint List votes for, Ra’am abstains59538Passes
D. Both Arab-led parties abstain, UTJ votes against485319Fails
E. Both Arab-led parties abstain, UTJ abstains484626Passes
F. Arab-led parties vote for, Yisrael Beytenu abstains60537Passes
G. Haredi parties join, Arab-led parties vote against61590Passes
Source: seats from the Central Elections Committee via The Times of Israel, 30 October 2026; confidence rule from Basic Law: The Government (2001), sections 13(d) and 28(b); 2021 precedent from Al-Monitor, 14 June 2021. Illustrative, computed by Titanica on the assumption that all 120 members are present and each list votes as one; parties not named vote with their campaign bloc (in F and G the government is 41 and 61 seats respectively). Not a forecast. · Exhibit 04 · I.FL.CONT.01

The scenarios show the limit of the Arab-led parties’ position as well as its extent. Abstention by both parties is not enough on its own: 48 votes in favour against 53 opposed would fail (scenario D). The assessment of Al Jazeera’s correspondent Nour Odeh, that Eisenkot would most likely need a deal for the Arab-led parties “to abstain at the very least”, therefore holds only if United Torah Judaism also stays out of the vote against.7 Six or more Arab-led members voting in favour, with the rest abstaining, would carry a 48-seat government against the full Netanyahu bloc. The vote of Ra’am alone would do so (scenario B), and so would that of the Joint List alone (scenario C).

The scenarios also show the alternative. If United Torah Judaism, which recommended no candidate, abstained, a 48-seat government would pass without a single Arab-led vote (scenario E). The Haredi parties therefore hold a second key to the same door, which is the reason the second route in Exhibit 03 is more than a paper possibility.

Once installed, a minority government could be removed only by 61 members agreeing on a named alternative.27 Under the certified results, the Netanyahu bloc could reach that number only with at least one Arab-led party or with members of Eisenkot’s own bloc, and the Arab-led parties have said they will not support Netanyahu’s return.8

The contest over the count

The third test concerns the legitimacy of the result, and here the sources are specific about who made which claim, and against whom.

On 28 October, the day after the vote, the committee’s chairman, Supreme Court Deputy President Noam Sohlberg, wrote to the head of the Shin Bet, David Zini, that “serious suspicions have been brought before me of improper influence, through foreign funding”, and asked the agency “to locate evidence to substantiate the aforementioned suspicions or to refute them” within a week. He added: “I cannot attest to the nature of the aforementioned suspicions.”28 Channel 12 reported that the suspicions concerned funds from Qatar intended to raise turnout in Arab communities.28 The Shin Bet said its inquiry “does not cast aspersions on or accuse an entire sector that went out to vote democratically and legally”, and that “only those who acted in violation of the law will be dealt with.”29 Qatar described the allegations as a “disinformation campaign.”30

The claims made by politicians went further and were directed at the Arab-led parties by name. Likud said, without presenting evidence, that the Arab-led parties had “stolen” the vote with Qatari funding, and listed allegations of cash envelopes, identity fraud and discrepancies in the count in Arab communities.3028 Before the polls opened, police had arrested three political activists found carrying envelopes of cash that police said were intended to bribe voters, and said the suspects were connected to Ra’am. Ra’am denies any involvement, and Abbas described the arrests as “an attempt to influence the election results.”307 National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir wrote: “The elections were stolen, the results are fraudulent, foreign countries interfered”, called on the Shin Bet chief to arrest the leaders of the Arab-led parties, and demanded that certification and government formation be frozen. The Likud legislator Amit Halevi resigned from the committee, alleging that some lawmakers had “bought their seats with bribe money” and that the vote reflected “the choice of the rulers of Qatar, Iran or Turkey.”2

The Shin Bet told the committee that its intelligence pointed to widespread foreign funding and influence operations involving “thousands of people and possibly more”, according to The Times of Israel as cited by Al Jazeera. Law enforcement sources told Haaretz they were unaware of any operation of that size.2 By 3 November the Shin Bet was seeking to question four Arab politicians, and had provided prosecutors with evidence concerning one of them. Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara was reported to want evidence before authorising questioning of the others, and to regard the allegations as possible ordinary criminal offences rather than national security violations.312

The committee’s answer was procedural and explicit. Sohlberg said on 1 November that “even if the suspicions are substantiated, this would not undermine the integrity of the electoral process.”30 On 4 November the committee reported that it had reviewed 9,069 polling stations and found “no evidence of irregularities that compromised the integrity of the election or affected its results.”2 Its acting director general, Dean Livne, said every complaint had been examined “individually and thoroughly” and that the results “accurately reflect the choices voters made at the ballot box.”3 In the committee’s five-member presidium, the representatives of Yesh Atid and Blue and White voted to ratify, those of Likud and Shas abstained, and Sohlberg cast the deciding vote. He said: “There is one thing on which we must agree: election results, as lawfully determined, are binding on us all.”2 A committee spokesperson said the Shin Bet investigation into alleged foreign interference was continuing.3

Herzog accepted the certified results the same day. He supported the investigation of suspected interference, warned against smearing Arab voters, and said: “I condemn the coarseness and racist expressions that we have heard recently.”32 Eisenkot accused Netanyahu of an “orchestrated and organised campaign to delegitimise the results.”30

The third test passes. The fraud and foreign-influence claims were directed at the Arab-led vote, and the sources establish who made each one. The committee certified the result after a review that found no irregularities affecting it, and the security investigation continues without, so far, a finding that would change the count. The dispute over the result and the dispute over the coalition concern the same 19 seats.

The voters behind the arithmetic

Public opinion on the first route is divided along the lines of the blocs. A survey by the Hebrew University’s Accord Center, conducted on election day among 467 people who had just voted for one of the four Eisenkot-bloc parties, found that 61 per cent preferred a government led by Eisenkot that included Ra’am; 20 per cent preferred new elections, 12 per cent a rotation government with Netanyahu, and 7 per cent a coalition with the Haredi parties.33

Among Arab citizens, a survey by the Moshe Dayan Center published in May 2026 found that 77.2 per cent supported the inclusion of an Arab party in the government formed after the election. Within that total, 43.3 per cent supported an Arab party joining any government and 33.9 per cent joining a centre-left government. The same survey estimated that Arab turnout would rise from 53 to 67 per cent if the Joint List were re-established.34

Comparable figures for the Jewish public as a whole come from the period of the 2021 coalition. In March 2021 the Israel Democracy Institute found that 44 per cent of Jewish respondents supported a government with outside support from Arab parties and 41 per cent opposed it; in February 2020 the share in favour had been 23 per cent. Among Jewish respondents who identified with the right, support was 34 per cent.35 No survey opened for this Dispatch measures Jewish opinion on the question after the 2026 vote.

The strongest case against

The decisive question is a Netanyahu–Eisenkot arrangement or a Haredi realignment, and the Arab-led parties are a bargaining position inside those talks rather than the hinge of the outcome. Eisenkot ruled out governing with them during the campaign, his own partner Liberman has refused a minority government, and the Haredi parties’ break with Netanyahu over military service gives Eisenkot a route to exactly 61 that needs no Arab vote at all. On this reading, the 19 seats matter mainly as a threat that moves Likud or the Haredi parties, and the government that emerges, if one does, will not depend on them.

The argument is strong on its own terms, and the evidence supports parts of it. The second route exists, and Exhibit 04 shows that abstention by United Torah Judaism alone could install a 48-seat government. Nothing in the record establishes which route will prevail. The argument does not dispose of the thesis, however, because the thesis concerns weight, and the counter-argument itself depends on the 19 seats: a bargaining position that can move Likud or the Haredi parties has weight in the formation of the government. The two other routes also require parties to reverse positions taken on the record, while the first requires reversals only from within the Eisenkot bloc. None of the sources reviewed, the latest dated 7 November, reports a signed coalition agreement.

The calendar

The law fixes the time available. The President must assign the task of forming a government within seven days of the publication of the results; the member assigned has 28 days, which the President may extend by periods totalling no more than 14 days.27 If that member fails, the President may assign another for a further 28 days, or a majority of Knesset members may ask him to assign a particular member, who then has 14 days. If no government is formed, elections are held on the last Tuesday before the end of 90 days from the President’s announcement.27

I · THE FORCES — FAULT LINES

Eisenkot’s first deadline falls on 6 December and his last possible one on 20 December.
Government formation after the election to the 26th Knesset, 27 October to 20 December 2026
DateEvent
Tue 27 OctElection to the 26th Knesset; turnout 77.9%
Wed 28 OctCommittee chairman asks the Shin Bet to substantiate or refute suspicions of foreign funding within a week
Fri 30 OctFinal count published: Netanyahu bloc 53, Eisenkot bloc 48, Arab-led parties 19
Sun 1 NovCommittee chairman: suspicions, even if substantiated, would not undermine the integrity of the process
Tue 3 NovEisenkot-bloc leaders endorse his four principles and recommend him
Wed 4 NovCommittee certifies results after reviewing 9,069 polling stations; President receives them and begins consultations
Thu 5 NovConsultations end: 67 members recommend Eisenkot, 46 Netanyahu; Joint List and Ra’am recommend Eisenkot
Sat 7 NovPresident announces he will assign the task to Eisenkot; Netanyahu calls for a national unity government
Sun 8 NovEisenkot formally assigned the task of forming a government
Sun 6 DecEnd of the 28-day period
Sun 20 DecLatest end of the period with the maximum 14-day extension
Source: The Times of Israel, 30 October 2026; JNS, 29 October and 6 November 2026; Al Jazeera, 2, 3, 4 and 5 November 2026; Ynet, 3 November 2026; Asianet Newsable, 7 November 2026; the Associated Press, 7 November 2026; Basic Law: The Government (2001), sections 7–8. Deadlines computed by Titanica from the date of assignment. · Exhibit 05 · I.FL.CONT.01

The consultations ran on 4 and 5 November, after Herzog received the certified results from Sohlberg on 4 November.3632 On 7 November the President’s office announced that Herzog “has decided to task the chairman of the Yashar party, Gadi Eisenkot, with forming the government”, and the task was formally conferred the following day.4 Eisenkot wrote that evening: “This is the time to establish a national emergency government. I will do anything possible to prove us worthy.”25 Herzog had said after the consultations that “mutual vetoes between the blocs and within the blocs themselves” made it difficult to determine who could form a coalition.8

Counted from the assignment on 8 November, the 28 days end on 6 December, and the maximum extension would carry the period to 20 December. If Eisenkot does not form a government by then, the law provides for a second candidate or a request from 61 members, and, failing both, a new election early in 2027.272

The arithmetic of the 26th Knesset has three exits, and two of them require parties to act against positions they took during the campaign. The third requires members of the Eisenkot bloc to accept, in some form, the votes of the two parties whose result was challenged before it was certified. The certified count and the law on confidence votes leave the Arab-led parties’ 19 seats inside every calculation of how a government can be formed before 20 December.

  1. The Times of Israel, “With all votes counted, Netanyahu’s bloc has 53 seats, Eisenkot’s 48, Arab parties 19”, 30 October 2026 (press report, citing Central Elections Committee figures). https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-all-votes-counted-netanyahus-bloc-at-53-seats-eisenkots-48-arab-parties-19/. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  2. Al Jazeera, “Israel vote results confirmed as election commission rejects fraud claims”, 4 November 2026 (press report). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/4/israel-vote-results-confirmed-as-election-commission-rejects-fraud-claims. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  3. Associated Press, “Israel’s election commission says no fraud found in last week’s vote”, 4 November 2026, as published by The Week (press report). https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/international/2026/11/04/israel-s-election-commission-says-no-fraud-found-in-last-week-s-vote.amp.html. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  4. Asianet Newsable, “Gadi Eisenkot formally tasked with forming new government in Israel”, 7 November 2026, quoting the statement of the Office of the President of Israel (press report). https://newsable.asianetnews.com/world/gadi-eisenkot-formally-tasked-with-forming-new-government-in-israel-articleshow-am0l2pw. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  5. Arutz Sheva (Israel National News), “Herzog receives the official results”, 9 November 2022 (press report, citing Central Elections Committee figures). https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/362510. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  6. Yeni Şafak, “Religious Zionism and Zehut form joint list for Israel’s October election”, 2 September 2026 (press report). https://en.yenisafak.com/world/israels-religious-zionism-and-zehut-form-election-alliance-3722662. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  7. Al Jazeera, “Joint List says it will back Eisenkot to form Israel’s next government”, 5 November 2026 (press report). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/5/joint-list-says-it-will-back-eisenkot-to-form-israels-next-government. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  8. Al Jazeera, “President Herzog faces key choice as Israel struggles to form government”, 7 November 2026 (press report). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/7/president-herzog-faces-key-choice-as-israel-struggles-to-form-government. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  9. Ron Gerlitz, “Rabin’s legacy: A government inclusive of all citizens, not only Jews”, +972 Magazine, 31 October 2015 (commentary). https://972mag.com/rabins-legacy-a-government-inclusive-of-all-citizens-not-only-jews/113375/. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  10. Afif Abu Much, “Participation in Israeli coalition government opens new chapter for Arab parties”, Al-Monitor, 14 June 2021 (press report). https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/participation-israeli-coalition-government-opens-new-chapter-arab-parties. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  11. The Times of Israel, “Knesset set to swear in new government, unseating Netanyahu”, 13 June 2021 (press report). https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-set-to-swear-in-new-government-unseating-netanyahu/. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  12. Arik Rudnitzky, “Arab Votes for the 21st Knesset”, Israel Democracy Institute, 18 April 2019 (analyst estimate). https://en.idi.org.il/articles/26602. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  13. Arik Rudnitzky, “Arab Votes September 2019 – Analysis”, Israel Democracy Institute, 23 September 2019 (analyst estimate). https://en.idi.org.il/articles/28660. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  14. Arik Rudnitzky, “The Arab Israeli Vote in the 23rd Knesset Elections”, Israel Democracy Institute, 10 March 2020 (analyst estimate). https://en.idi.org.il/articles/30961. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  15. Ynet, “Arab voter turnout surges as parties projected to nearly double their seats”, 27 October 2026 (press report). https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hym008yc3fe. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  16. Arik Rudnitzky, “Elections for the 25th Knesset: An Analysis of the Results in the Arab Sector”, Israel Democracy Institute, 25 December 2022 (analyst estimate). https://en.idi.org.il/articles/47986. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  17. Ephraim Lavie, Mohammed Wattad, Aref Abu Gweder, Ilham Shahbari, Jony Essa and Meir Elran, “Arab Society in Israel and the Elections to the 25th Knesset”, INSS Insight No. 1661, Institute for National Security Studies, 20 November 2022 (analyst estimate). https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/No.-1661.pdf. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  18. Al Jazeera, “Israel election turnout hits 77.7%, highest since 1999”, 27 October 2026 (press report). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/27/israel-election-turnout-highest-in-50-years-as-voting-continues. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  19. Florit Shoihet, “The quiet revolution behind Israel’s record Arab turnout”, Jewish News, 5 November 2026, citing an Israel Democracy Institute estimate (press report). https://www.jewishnews.co.uk/the-quiet-revolution-behind-israels-record-arab-turnout/. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  20. Reuters, “For Israel’s Arabs, record turnout may bring political clout”, 29 October 2026, as published by TimesLIVE (press report). https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/world/2026-10-29-for-israels-arabs-record-turnout-may-bring-political-clout/. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  21. The Jerusalem Post, “Israel election results: Benjamin Netanyahu bloc wins 53 seats, opposition holds 48”, 28 October 2026 (press report). https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-913122. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  22. Al Jazeera, “Israel’s opposition leaders back Eisenkot to oust Netanyahu”, 3 November 2026 (press report). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/3/israeli-opposition-leaders-back-eisenkot-to-oust-netanyahu. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  23. Ynet, “‘History will not forgive them’: Eisenkot presses minority government plan, takes aim at Liberman”, 6 November 2026 (press report). https://www.ynetnews.com/article/s1rqpujazx. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  24. Ynet, “Liberman rejects Eisenkot’s minority government plan, deepening opposition rift ahead of vote”, 15 October 2026 (press report). https://www.ynetnews.com/article/s1ei11wajmx. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  25. Associated Press, “Israeli opposition candidate Gadi Eisenkot to form governing coalition”, 7 November 2026, as published by The Irish News (press report). https://www.irishnews.com/news/world/israeli-opposition-candidate-gadi-eisenkot-to-form-governing-coalition-GTUAX6J44VJDVFS2OT22SI3RHI/. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  26. To Vima International, “Eisenkot reports progress as opposition courts ultra-Orthodox”, 6 November 2026 (press report). https://www.tovima.com/world/eisenkot-reports-progress-as-opposition-courts-ultra-orthodox/. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  27. State of Israel, Basic Law: The Government (2001), passed 7 March 2001, sections 7–11, 13 and 28, English translation hosted by the Jewish Virtual Library (official text, translation). https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/Basic_Law_Government01.html. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  28. JNS, “Israeli elections chief orders Shin Bet probe of foreign influence on vote”, 29 October 2026, as republished by Voz (press report, quoting the committee chairman’s letter). https://voz.us/en/mundo/jns/261029/1000149/israeli-elections-chief-orders-shin-bet-probe-of-foreign-influence-on-vote.html. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  29. Devdiscourse, “Shin Bet says alleged fraud in Israel elections will be probed on intelligence-based inputs, denies targeting Arabs”, 29 October 2026 (press report). https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/international/3999135-shin-bet-says-alleged-fraud-in-israsel-elections-will-be-probed-on-intelligence-based-inputs-denies-targeting-arabs. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  30. Al Jazeera, “Israeli officials say results stand as Netanyahu claims election ‘stolen'”, 2 November 2026 (press report). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/2/israeli-officials-say-results-stand-as-netanyahu-claims-election-stolen. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  31. Ynet, “Shin Bet chief seeks to question Arab politicians over alleged foreign election interference”, 3 November 2026 (press report). https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rjbsaippmg. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  32. Al Jazeera, “Israel’s Herzog accepts vote results, opens talks on forming a government”, 5 November 2026 (press report). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/5/israels-herzog-accepts-vote-results-opens-talks-on-forming-a-government. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  33. Shir Perets, “Majority of opposition voters back Eisenkot-led government with Arab party Ra’am – poll”, The Jerusalem Post, 29 October 2026, reporting a Hebrew University aChord Center survey (press report). https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-913294. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  34. Arik Rudnitzky, “Integration and Influence: Survey of Arab Citizens in Israel”, Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 14 May 2026 (analyst estimate). https://dayan.org/content/integration-and-influence-survey-arab-citizens-israel. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  35. The Times of Israel, “Poll: 48% of Israelis favor government with outside support from Arab parties”, 4 April 2021, reporting the Israel Democracy Institute’s Israeli Voice Index for March 2021 (press report). https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-48-of-israelis-favor-government-with-outside-support-from-arab-parties/. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
  36. Ynet, “Eisenkot poised to get first shot at government as Herzog set to meet party leaders | What happens next”, 3 November 2026 (press report). https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hygsh5ptgx. Accessed 10 November 2026. ↩︎
Read through the Method
Context
The certification on 4 November 2026 of the election to the 26th Knesset held on 27 October; the President's consultations of 4–5 November and the assignment of the mandate to Gadi Eisenkot on 8 November; the deadlines of Basic Law: The Government; the fraud and foreign-influence claims raised after the vote.
Causes
The loss of the Netanyahu bloc's majority; record turnout in Arab localities; the Haredi parties' break with Netanyahu over military service; declared vetoes within and between the blocs; the rule that a confidence vote needs more votes for than against, while removal needs 61.
Actors
The Central Elections Committee and its chairman Noam Sohlberg; President Isaac Herzog; Likud, Yashar, B'Yachad, The Democrats, Yisrael Beytenu, Shas, United Torah Judaism, Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionism; Ra'am and the Joint List; the Shin Bet; the Attorney General; police; the government of Qatar.
Perspectives
States three falsification tests and reports that the first failed in its original form and the second narrowed the claim, so that the thesis concerns weight, not exclusive dependence; enumerates every seat combination; labels the confidence-vote table as illustrative; attributes every fraud and influence claim and sets it against the committee's findings; describes positions without judging any party, community or policy.
Relationships
Second Fault Lines Dispatch. Links to Fault Lines (The End of the Multipolar Myth), Demos (Thirty-Two Percent) and Imperium (A Quarter of China's Central Committee Was Missing).

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