Copernicus reported on 6 November that October 2026 was the warmest October in its ERA5 record and that the year is virtually certain to finish above 1.5°C. Vulnerable states secured 1.5°C in the Paris Agreement before the IPCC had assessed it in a dedicated report, and later research strengthened the case for it. The parties have since committed to limiting any overshoot of the limit without agreeing its terms: how high, for how long, and who removes the excess carbon.
On 6 November 2026 the Copernicus Climate Change Service reported that October had been the warmest October in its ERA5 record, 1.75°C above the 1850–1900 average.1 It projected the 2026 annual mean at between 1.56°C and 1.61°C, a 95 per cent prediction interval, and called the year virtually certain to finish above 1.5°C.1 In ERA5 it would be the second calendar year above that level, after 2024.2 COP31 opens in Antalya on 9 November.
A calendar year above 1.5°C does not mean the Paris limit has been exceeded. The limit refers to long-term warming, which the IPCC convention measures as an average over 20 years. Using several methods, Copernicus estimated current long-term warming at about 1.4°C in its assessment of 2025.3 The independent Indicators of Global Climate Change team estimates that human-induced warming could reach 1.5°C around 2030 if emissions continue at current levels.4
The number entered the climate regime as a demand of small island states and the least developed countries in 2008 and 2009. The expert dialogue that reviewed the long-term goal in 2015 described the evidence specific to 1.5°C as less developed, while identifying its benefits. The parties wrote the limit into the Paris Agreement that December and asked the IPCC for a dedicated assessment afterwards.
The 1.5°C limit entered the Paris Agreement as a negotiated demand, before the IPCC had assessed it in a dedicated report. Later research strengthened the evidence for it and specified the emission cuts it requires, which the parties’ pledges do not approach. The parties now refer to overshoot pathways that science defines in numbers, yet their decisions contain no operational terms for an overshoot: no agreed peak, no date of return and no allocation of the carbon removals a return would require.
The claim can be checked against the record. It is wrong if any adopted decision of the parties, as of 6 November 2026, sets a peak temperature, a return date or a removal volume for an overshoot of 1.5°C. It is wrong on the history if the IPCC had assessed 1.5°C in a dedicated report before December 2015. It is wrong on the gap if the central estimate of the parties’ pledges for 2035 comes within ten percentage points of the 60 per cent cut, against 2019, that they recorded as the requirement for 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. Pledge adequacy measures promised action and does not by itself establish physical feasibility. The Antalya decisions, due by 20 November, can change the first finding.
I. A demand from the islands
The older number has a longer genealogy. In a 1975 working paper at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and again in a 1977 article in the American Economic Review, the economist William Nordhaus suggested that warming of more than 2°C or 3°C above the average of his time would take the climate outside the range observed over several hundred thousand years.5 He offered the figure as a rough boundary for reasoning about carbon dioxide, and he did not present it as an estimate of damage.
The threshold acquired an institutional form over the next two decades. In 1990 a report by the Stockholm Environment Institute for the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, edited by Frank Rijsberman and Rob Swart, identified two limits: 1°C, above which ecosystems could respond in rapid, unpredictable and non-linear ways, and 2°C as an upper limit beyond which the risk of grave damage would rise rapidly.6 In June 1996 the Council of the European Union concluded that global average temperatures should not exceed 2°C above the pre-industrial level.7 In July 2009 the G8 leaders meeting at L’Aquila recognised the scientific view that the increase should not exceed 2°C.8
1.5°C arrived from a different direction. At the Poznań conference in December 2008, the Alliance of Small Island States and the group of least developed countries called for warming to be held to 1.5°C, together with a ceiling on greenhouse gas concentrations of 350 parts per million.9 On 21 September 2009 the AOSIS leaders’ summit adopted a declaration asking that warming be kept “well below 1.5° C above pre-industrial levels”, alongside targets for emissions, concentrations and finance.10 Campaigners that autumn used the slogan “1.5 to stay alive”.9
The position rested on exposure. For a low-lying atoll, the difference between 1.5°C and 2°C is measured in sea-level rise, coral loss and the habitability of the land. The demand was political in form and physical in motive. Research specifically comparing 1.5°C pathways and impacts was still limited, and the literature was organised around 2°C, the figure the policy debate had used.
At Copenhagen in December 2009 the demand met its first institutional test. The Copenhagen Accord kept 2°C as the goal and provided, in its paragraph 12, for an assessment by 2015 that would consider strengthening the goal “in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius”.11 A small group of parties, Tuvalu among them, objected to the Accord, and the conference decided only to take note of it.11 A year later, decision 1/CP.16 at Cancún adopted the 2°C goal and launched a review of its adequacy that would include strengthening it “in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5 °C”.12 Cancún thus incorporated the review of 1.5°C into a substantive decision of the Conference of the Parties.
II. What the experts said, and what Paris wrote
The review that Cancún launched was carried out between 2013 and 2015 by a Structured Expert Dialogue, which reported to the parties on 4 May 2015.13 Its conclusions are the parties’ own expert review of the long-term goal before Paris.
The dialogue questioned 2°C first. It found the idea of a safe “guardrail” up to 2°C inadequate and proposed that the limit be seen as a “defence line”, to be pushed as low as possible.13 Its tenth message described the science on a 1.5°C limit as “less robust than for the 2 °C warming limit”.13 It also found that limiting warming to 1.5°C would bring advantages, and that the pathways then available implied greater reliance on negative emissions and the risk of a larger temperature overshoot.13 It concluded that considerations on strengthening the goal to 1.5°C “may therefore have to continue”.13
The dialogue did not prescribe a single numerical target. Its record shows that 1.5°C had been assessed before Paris, in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report and in the dialogue itself, with fewer studies than 2°C and with overshoot already named as the risk of the pathways.
The decision was taken in Paris by ministers. During COP21 the Marshall Islands’ foreign minister, Tony de Brum, publicly mobilised a “High Ambition Coalition” developed over the preceding months, which brought together vulnerable states, the European Union and, late in the talks, Brazil. Dean Bialek, an adviser to the Marshall Islands, later described the coalition as instrumental in opening some developed countries to 1.5°C; the EU’s climate commissioner, Miguel Arias Cañete, was among its public faces.14
Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement records the result. It commits the parties to “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”.15 The first clause sets a level to stay well below. The second commits the parties to efforts toward a lower one. In the decision adopting the Agreement, paragraph 21 invited the IPCC to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of 1.5°C and the emission pathways to it.15 The limit entered the treaty before the dedicated assessment of it.
The Agreement also fixed the architecture within which any goal would operate. Each party sets its own contribution. The committee created by Article 15 to promote compliance is, in the treaty’s words, “non-adversarial and non-punitive”.15 The Agreement measures collective progress through a global stocktake every five years and provides no automatic penalty triggered by exceeding a temperature level.
| Date | Event | Temperature | Nature |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1975 / 1977 | Nordhaus, IIASA working paper and American Economic Review | 2–3°C above the then-current average | Academic |
| 1990 | Stockholm Environment Institute report for the AGGG | 1°C and 2°C limits | Expert report |
| June 1996 | Council of the EU conclusions | 2°C | Political |
| Dec 2008 | AOSIS and LDCs at Poznań (COP14) | 1.5°C | Negotiating position |
| July 2009 | G8 Declaration, L’Aquila, para. 65 | 2°C | Political |
| Sep 2009 | AOSIS Summit Declaration, para. 6(b)(ii) | “Well below 1.5°C” | Negotiating position |
| Dec 2009 | Copenhagen Accord, para. 12 (taken note of, 2/CP.15) | 2°C; 1.5°C for review | Accord noted |
| Dec 2010 | Decision 1/CP.16, Cancún | 2°C; review incl. 1.5°C | COP decision |
| May 2015 | Structured Expert Dialogue, FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1 | 1.5°C science “less robust”; benefits noted | Expert report |
| Dec 2015 | Paris Agreement, Art. 2.1(a); 1/CP.21, para. 21 | Well below 2°C; efforts to 1.5°C | Treaty |
| Oct 2018 | IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C | Dedicated assessment | Scientific assessment |
| Nov 2021 | Glasgow, decision 1/CMA.3 | Resolve to pursue 1.5°C | CMA decision |
| Dec 2023 | First global stocktake, 1/CMA.5, para. 27 | 1.5°C, no or limited overshoot | CMA decision |
| 2024 | First calendar year above 1.5°C (WMO 1.55 ± 0.13°C) | Single year, observed | Official statistic |
| July 2025 | ICJ Advisory Opinion, para. 224 | 1.5°C “primary temperature goal” | Judicial, advisory |
| Nov 2025 | Belém, decision 1/CMA.7, para. 7 | Limit magnitude and duration of any overshoot | CMA decision |
| 2026 | Second calendar year above 1.5°C in ERA5 | Single year, projected | Official projection |
III. What the science added after Paris
The IPCC delivered the requested report on 8 October 2018. Piers Forster, a climate scientist who later led the annual Indicators updates, recalled that when it was commissioned there were “almost no papers on the 1.5 targets”, a gap he linked to the distance between scientists and the negotiations.9 The report filled that gap and confirmed the islands’ reading of the stakes. Coral reefs were projected to decline by a further 70 to 90 per cent at 1.5°C and by more than 99 per cent at 2°C.16 The report found lower risks at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat extremes, sea-level rise, species loss and food yields, and warned that some losses, including of certain ecosystems, would be irreversible.16
It also described what holding the limit would require. If warming continued at the rate of the time, it would reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052.16 To hold it there with no or limited overshoot, net emissions of carbon dioxide would need to fall by about 45 per cent from 2010 levels by 2030 and reach net zero around 2050.16 The report defined pathways with limited overshoot as those peaking below about 1.6°C and returning below 1.5°C by 2100.16 It gave a remaining budget for an even chance of 1.5°C of 580 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO₂) from the start of 2018 on one temperature metric, and 770 GtCO₂ on another.16
The research that followed Paris thus strengthened the case for 1.5°C as a limit associated with materially lower risks than 2°C. It did not show that the limit would be held. It showed the pace of cuts required, on a timetable that began immediately.
The parties then raised the standing of the number. At Glasgow in 2021 they recognised that impacts would be much lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C and resolved to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.17 The first global stocktake, at Dubai in December 2023, recorded that 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot required cuts in greenhouse gas emissions of 43 per cent by 2030 and 60 per cent by 2035, against 2019 levels, and net zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050.18
On 23 July 2025 the International Court of Justice drew a legal consequence. In paragraph 224 of its advisory opinion, it found that 1.5°C had become “the scientifically based consensus target” under the Paris Agreement and “the parties’ agreed primary temperature goal”.19 In paragraphs 245 and 249 it read the Agreement as requiring the parties’ contributions, taken together, to be capable of achieving that goal.19 The Court based this reading on the parties’ later decisions, which it treated as subsequent agreements under the law of treaties.20 Some international lawyers have questioned that step. Stephen Humphreys observed that the opinion does not engage with the scientific record on whether 1.5°C remained attainable.21
IV. Single years and the long-term limit
The measurements depend on a definition. The IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report dates the reaching of a warming level to the midpoint of the first 20-year period whose average exceeds it, and the World Meteorological Organization applies the same convention.22 The treaty itself does not prescribe a statistical definition. A single year above 1.5°C therefore says little about the Paris limit by itself. A run of such years, with no cooler years to offset them, moves the 20-year average.
The observed 2024 crossing and the projected 2026 one both carry natural warming on top of the trend. For 2024, the WMO’s consolidation of six datasets put the global mean at 1.55°C (± 0.13) above pre-industrial, and Copernicus put it at 1.60°C.2 In 2025, a year of neutral or weak La Niña conditions, Copernicus measured 1.47°C and the WMO, consolidating eight datasets, 1.44°C (± 0.13).3, 23 Copernicus calculated that the average of 2023 to 2025 exceeded 1.5°C, the first three-year period to do so in its record.3
El Niño conditions strengthened during 2026, and in September Copernicus reported a record sea surface temperature in a key Pacific region.24 The October bulletin gives a one-in-five chance that 2026 ties or exceeds 2024, and projects that the average of 2023 to 2026 will also exceed 1.5°C.1 An analysis of six datasets by Carbon Brief, an independent publication, puts the full year at 1.52°C, with a 90 per cent range of 1.50 to 1.55°C.25 That figure is an analyst estimate. The WMO will publish its consolidated figure in early 2027.
The long-term estimates move more slowly. The Indicators team, which applies IPCC methods each year, estimated human-induced warming at 1.37°C in 2025 (range 1.1 to 1.7°C), rising by about 0.27°C per decade over 2016 to 2025 (range 0.2 to 0.4).4 Observed warming averaged over 2016 to 2025 was 1.26°C (range 1.13 to 1.36°C).4 The WMO’s decadal forecast, issued in May 2026, gave a 75 per cent chance that the five-year mean for 2026 to 2030 would exceed 1.5°C.22
| Period | Measure | Copernicus ERA5 (°C) | WMO consolidated (°C) | Nature of source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Single year | 1.48 | 1.45 ± 0.12 | Official statistic |
| 2024 | Single year | 1.60 | 1.55 ± 0.13 (six datasets) | Official statistic |
| 2025 | Single year | 1.47 | 1.44 ± 0.13 (eight datasets) | Official statistic |
| 2026 | Single year, projected | 1.56–1.61 (95% prediction interval) | Not yet published | Official projection |
| 2023–2025 | Three-year mean | Above 1.5 | 1.48 ± 0.13 | Official statistic |
| Period | Measure | Value (°C) | Source and nature |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Six-dataset full-year projection | 1.52 (90% range 1.50–1.55) | Carbon Brief, analyst estimate |
| 2025 | Current long-term warming, several methods | about 1.4 | Copernicus, official estimate |
| 2016–2025 | Observed ten-year mean | 1.26 (1.13–1.36) | IGCC 2025, peer-reviewed |
| 2025 | Human-induced warming | 1.37 (1.1–1.7) | IGCC 2025, peer-reviewed |
| 2026–2030 | Probability five-year mean exceeds 1.5 | 75% | WMO decadal update, official forecast |
The distinction cuts both ways. The years above 1.5°C do not show that the Paris limit has been exceeded. They are also consistent with the trend. Successive Indicators assessments, each incorporating revisions, have put human-induced warming at 1.31°C for 2023, 1.36°C for 2024 and 1.37°C for 2025, each within a range of about 1.1 to 1.7°C.4, 26 On that team’s central estimate, human-induced warming reaches 1.5°C around 2030 if emissions continue at current levels.
V. The budget in years
The carbon budget translates the temperature limit into a quantity of emissions. It is the amount of carbon dioxide that can still be emitted for a stated chance of staying below a given level of warming. Successive estimates differ in methods, temperature metrics and assumptions about other greenhouse gases, which makes them comparable only with care.
The IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report, in 2021, gave 500 GtCO₂ from the start of 2020 for an even chance of 1.5°C.27 The annual Indicators update gave 250 GtCO₂ from the start of 2023, 200 GtCO₂ from the start of 2024, and 130 GtCO₂ from the start of 2025.26 The edition published in June 2026 gave 130 GtCO₂ again, from the start of 2026, and said that this would be used up in about three years at current emissions.4 Both of the last two editions report a rounded central estimate of 130 GtCO₂ despite the later starting date. They are reassessments using updated inputs, so their difference cannot be read as a year of emissions alone.
Expressed at a common rate of 42 GtCO₂ a year, the selected central estimates correspond to progressively shorter durations, from about fourteen years to about three, until the final two, which are equal. These calculations express emissions-equivalent durations under a constant-rate assumption. They are not forecasts of the date when long-term warming reaches 1.5°C.
| Estimate | Budget (GtCO₂) | From | Years at 42 GtCO₂/yr | Illustrative exhaustion |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IPCC SR1.5 (2018), GMST metric | 770 | 1 Jan 2018 | 18.3 | early 2036 |
| IPCC SR1.5 (2018), surface air temperature metric | 580 | 1 Jan 2018 | 13.8 | late 2031 |
| IPCC AR6 WG1 (2021) | 500 | 1 Jan 2020 | 11.9 | late 2031 |
| IGCC 2022 (pub. 2023) | 250 | 1 Jan 2023 | 6.0 | end 2028 |
| IGCC 2023 (pub. 2024) | 200 (range 100–450) | 1 Jan 2024 | 4.8 | late 2028 |
| IGCC 2024 (pub. 2025) | 130 | 1 Jan 2025 | 3.1 | early 2028 |
| IGCC 2025 (pub. 2026) | 130 | 1 Jan 2026 | 3.1 | early 2029 |
A budget is a probability statement, and exceeding it raises the likelihood of passing 1.5°C without guaranteeing it. Its relevance to the politics is direct. Once the budget for 1.5°C is spent, a return below the limit requires net removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The size of the overshoot and the volume of removals are two expressions of the same quantity.
VI. Overshoot without terms
Two assessments published in October set out where the regime stands. On 21 October 2026 the UN Environment Programme published its Emissions Gap Report, titled “The Point of Return”.28 In the foreword, UNEP’s executive director, Inger Andersen, wrote that the chance of holding warming below 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot “is gone”.28 The report projects warming of 2.8°C this century under current policies, 2.6°C if all national contributions are delivered and comparable efforts continue, and about 2.1°C if net zero targets are also met.29
The report assesses a pathway for returning to the existing target after overshoot. In its “lowest possible” scenario, warming peaks at 1.7 to 1.8°C around mid-century, with about a 50 per cent chance of returning to 1.5°C or below by 2100.28 That pathway requires greenhouse gas emissions to fall by 18 per cent by 2030, 45 per cent by 2035 and 69 per cent by 2040, against 2025 levels.28 These reductions use a 2025 baseline and describe a larger overshoot. They are not interchangeable with the stocktake’s 2019-based benchmark for no or limited overshoot. Each further five years at current emissions adds about 0.1°C to the peak.28 The return depends on removing about 320 GtCO₂ from the atmosphere and storing it permanently, at a scale whose feasibility the report describes as uncertain.28 A return of temperature would also not reverse every impact incurred during the overshoot.16
Anne Olhoff, a lead author, attributed part of the deterioration since the 2025 report to the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement, which took effect on 27 January 2026, and to upward revisions of historical emissions.29, 30 The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, said that overshoot “is not surrender”, and that it could still be kept small and brief, with temperatures brought back below 1.5°C by the end of the century.29
The parties’ own synthesis points the same way. The UNFCCC secretariat’s report of 27 October 2026 covers 127 new contributions from 154 parties, about 71 per cent of global emissions in 2019, excluding land use.31 If fully implemented, they would bring emissions in 2035 to 6 per cent below 2019 levels (range 0 to 12), or 9 per cent (range 6 to 12) with conditional elements.31 With long-term net zero targets included, the report gives a best estimate of 1.7 to 2.3°C of warming by 2100.31 It notes that returning warming to 1.5°C “would require substantial additional GHG emission reductions in the coming years”.31
| Scenario | Temperature outcome and timing (°C) | Against 1.5°C | Against 2°C | Source and nature |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current policies | 2.8 this century, rising after | Exceeded | Exceeded | UNEP EGR 2026, assessment |
| All NDCs delivered, comparable effort continued | 2.6 this century | Exceeded | Exceeded | UNEP EGR 2026, assessment |
| NDCs plus net zero targets | about 2.1 this century | Exceeded | Slightly exceeded | UNEP EGR 2026, assessment |
| NDCs plus long-term targets | 1.7–2.3 by 2100 | Exceeded | Range spans 2°C | UNFCCC synthesis, FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/9 |
| UNEP “lowest possible” overshoot | Peak 1.7–1.8 mid-century; about 50% chance of ≤1.5 by 2100 | Exceeded, possible return | Below 2°C in this scenario; outcome uncertain | UNEP EGR 2026, scenario |
| Emissions in 2035 | Change against 2019 | Source and nature |
|---|---|---|
| New NDCs, unconditional | −6% (range 0 to −12%) | UNFCCC synthesis, official |
| New NDCs, with conditional elements | −9% (range −6 to −12%) | UNFCCC synthesis, official |
| Required for 1.5°C, no or limited overshoot | −60% | Decision 1/CMA.5, para. 27 |
The parties have begun to write overshoot into their decisions. The decision adopted at Belém in November 2025, known as the “Global Mutirão” and recorded as decision 1/CMA.7, called in paragraph 7 for limiting the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot.32 The Royal Meteorological Society and the COP30 presidency’s chief executive, Ana Toni, each described it as the first COP text to address overshoot in these terms.33 The decision also launched a “Belém Mission to 1.5” to support implementation of national contributions, with reporting to the next session.32
What the decisions contain is a reference to scientifically defined pathways. The 2023 stocktake and the Belém text both recall 1.5°C “with no or limited overshoot”, a category the IPCC defined as peaking below about 1.6°C and returning below 1.5°C by 2100.16, 18 UNEP’s lowest pathway now peaks at 1.7 to 1.8°C, above that category. What the decisions examined here do not contain is an operational agreement for the overshoot now projected: a ceiling for the peak, a timetable for the return, or an allocation of the removals.
COP31 runs in Antalya from 9 to 20 November under the presidency of Türkiye, with Australia’s climate minister, Chris Bowen, serving as President of Negotiations; the pre-COP was held in Fiji and Tuvalu in October.34 The provisional agenda for the Paris Agreement’s governing body at Antalya lists items on the global stocktake dialogue, the mitigation work programme, the features of national contributions, adaptation finance and trade. None of them is a separate item on the peak, duration or removal requirements of an overshoot.35 Parties can raise those questions under existing items, and the presidency can convene on them. The agenda does not oblige them to decide.
The counter-argument
Four objections deserve an answer.
First, the science later confirmed 1.5°C. It strengthened the case for it, as a limit associated with materially lower risks than 2°C. The thesis concerns sequence and the gap. The parties adopted the number before the dedicated assessment, and the assessment that followed described a pace of cuts that no round of pledges has approached.
Second, a target works even when it is missed. The evidence supports this. The number gave vulnerable states standing, organised a decade of scientific work, and became the benchmark against which the International Court of Justice reads national contributions.19 UNEP’s 2026 report finds that renewable electricity capacity expanded about three times as much as anticipated in 2015 current-policy projections, and solar photovoltaic capacity about seven times as much.28 The objection holds for what the target has achieved. It does not address the terms of an overshoot.
Third, the vocabulary of overshoot is already quantified. This is the strongest objection. The decisions recall pathways with “no or limited overshoot”, and the IPCC defined that category in numbers. The numbers belong to a scientific definition, recalled by the parties; they were never adopted as operational terms. The category they describe is also the one UNEP now finds out of reach, so the parties’ reference points no longer describe the overshoot their own synthesis projects.
Fourth, no goal in the regime has an exceedance rule. The treaty provides no automatic penalty for exceeding any temperature level, though legal obligations of conduct remain, as the International Court of Justice found. The question of operational terms also applies to other warming limits. It is most immediate for 1.5°C, the limit long-term warming is projected to reach first. The absence of a penalty is a design choice. The absence of operational terms is a separate gap, which the Belém decision itself identified by calling for limits on magnitude and duration without setting them.
VII. After the line
The states that pressed for 1.5°C did so because their territories depend on it, and the research that followed strengthened their case. The parties have since agreed that any overshoot should be limited in size and length. Between 9 and 20 November they can give that agreement terms, by setting a ceiling for the peak, a date for the return, or a share of the removals. Until they do, the commitment to limit overshoot remains an intention whose height, duration and cost have yet to be agreed.
Notes
- Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S), climate bulletin for October 2026, 5–6 November 2026 (official), https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-warmest-october-record-2026-virtually-certain-exceed-15degc, accessed 6 November 2026.
- World Meteorological Organization, “WMO confirms 2024 as warmest year on record at about 1.55°C above pre-industrial level”, 10 January 2025 (official), https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/wmo-confirms-2024-warmest-year-record-about-155degc-above-pre-industrial-level; Copernicus Climate Change Service, Global Climate Highlights 2024, 10 January 2025 (official), https://climate.copernicus.eu/global-climate-highlights-2024, accessed 6 November 2026.
- Copernicus Climate Change Service, “Copernicus: 2025 was the third-hottest year on record”, Global Climate Highlights 2025, 14 January 2026 (official), https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-2025-was-third-hottest-year-record, accessed 6 November 2026.
- Forster, P. M. et al., “Indicators of Global Climate Change 2025: annual update of key indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence”, Earth System Science Data 18, 3889, June 2026, sections 8–9 and Table 8 (peer-reviewed), https://essd.copernicus.org/articles/18/3889/2026/, accessed 6 November 2026.
- Nordhaus, W. D., “Can We Control Carbon Dioxide?”, IIASA Working Paper WP-75-063, June 1975 (academic), https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/365/; Nordhaus, W. D., “Economic Growth and Climate: The Carbon Dioxide Problem”, American Economic Review 67(1), 341–346, 1977 (peer-reviewed), https://www.jstor.org/stable/1815926 (accessed 6 November 2026). Wording as quoted in Carbon Brief, “Two degrees: The history of climate change’s ‘speed limit'”, 8 December 2014 (secondary), https://www.carbonbrief.org/two-degrees-the-history-of-climate-changes-speed-limit/, accessed 6 November 2026.
- Rijsberman, F. R. and Swart, R. J. (eds.), Targets and Indicators of Climatic Change, Stockholm Environment Institute for the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, 1990, executive summary, pp. vii–viii (expert report), https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/SEI-Report-TargetsAndIndicatorsOfClimaticChange-1990.pdf, accessed 6 November 2026.
- Council of the European Union, 1939th Council meeting (Environment), conclusions, 25 June 1996 (official), as quoted in Carbon Brief, 8 December 2014 (secondary), https://www.carbonbrief.org/two-degrees-the-history-of-climate-changes-speed-limit/, accessed 6 November 2026.
- G8, “Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future”, L’Aquila Summit Declaration, 8 July 2009, para. 65 (official), https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2009laquila/2009-declaration.html, accessed 6 November 2026.
- DeSmog, “1.5C or 2C? The history of the temperature target at the heart of the Paris Agreement”, 11 December 2022 (press, with interview of P. Forster), https://www.desmog.com/2022/12/11/15-2c-history-temperature-target-climate-paris-agreement/, accessed 6 November 2026.
- Alliance of Small Island States, Declaration on Climate Change 2009, AOSIS Summit, 21 September 2009, para. 6(b)(ii) (official negotiating position), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1566AOSISSummitDeclarationSept21FINAL.pdf, accessed 6 November 2026.
- UNFCCC, decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, para. 12, 18–19 December 2009 (official), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf; Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12 No. 459, 22 December 2009 (secondary), https://enb.iisd.org/events/copenhagen-climate-change-conference-cop-15/summary-report-7-19-december-2009, accessed 6 November 2026.
- UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.16, “The Cancun Agreements”, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, paras. 4 and 138–139, 10–11 December 2010 (official), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf, accessed 6 November 2026.
- UNFCCC, “Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013–2015 review”, FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, 4 May 2015, messages 5 and 10 (official), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sb/eng/inf01.pdf, accessed 6 November 2026.
- Climate Home News, “Foie gras, oysters and a climate deal: How the Paris pact was won”, 14 December 2015 (press), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/12/14/foie-gras-oysters-and-a-climate-deal-how-the-paris-pact-was-won/, accessed 6 November 2026.
- UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.21, “Adoption of the Paris Agreement”, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 21, and annexed Paris Agreement, Articles 2.1(a) and 15.2, 12 December 2015 (official; treaty), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf, accessed 6 November 2026.
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- Context
- Copernicus reported on 6 November 2026 that the year is virtually certain to finish above 1.5°C in ERA5. COP31 opens in Antalya on 9 November.
- Causes
- A temperature limit secured by vulnerable states in 2008–2015, a carbon budget spent faster than pledges have tightened, and a treaty that relies on national contributions and review rather than automatic penalties.
- Actors
- The Alliance of Small Island States and the least developed countries; the UNFCCC Structured Expert Dialogue; the IPCC; the International Court of Justice; UNEP; the UNFCCC secretariat; the Belém and Antalya presidencies.
- Perspectives
- Single years kept apart from long-term warming, limited evidence from absent evidence, scientific pathway definitions from operational agreements, and official statistics from analyst estimates; no assumption that a missed target has failed as an instrument.
- Relationships
- Opens the Anthropocene Domain. Links to Fault Lines (The End of the Multipolar Myth) and Imperium (One Country Can Stop Twenty-Six).