For a century the West borrowed other people’s gods as styles: Buddhism became mindfulness, Catholicism became couture. Islam is now cool in rap, fashion and football, but with a difference. This time the style arrives with the believer still inside it, and that is what makes it compelling to some and unsettling to the institutions that must deal with it.
This Dispatch argues one thing. The new Muslim cool reverses an old Western habit. For a century, Western culture took other people’s religions in as aesthetics it could enjoy without belief. The Muslim cool of the 2020s is made by believers, and its symbols arrive full: the prayer on the pitch, the hijab designed by a Muslim woman, the shahada declared on a livestream. It is the first religious cool the West cannot easily consume with the faith removed, and that is why the same societies meet it with admiration and with restriction.
The argument also says how it could be wrong. If Islamic aesthetics were circulating chiefly detached from practice — bought, worn and performed by non-Muslims with no religious content — there would be no reversal: Islam would simply be the latest faith turned into a style. The evidence assembled here points the other way, though no source yet measures non-Muslim adoption directly.
A Prayer on the Pitch
For several seasons, Liverpool supporters sang about Mohamed Salah in chants that, as political scientists later documented, referred to his goals, to mosques and to Allah. Each time he scored, the Egyptian forward knelt and pressed his forehead to the turf in sujood, the prostration of prayer, in front of one of the largest audiences in world sport. In the same country, on 4 June 2025, a newly elected MP stood up at Prime Minister’s Questions and asked for the burqa to be banned.
Early on 4 November 2026, the Associated Press called Michigan’s Senate race for Abdul El-Sayed, who will become the first Muslim member of the United States Senate. “They told us that someone with a name and my story, a Muslim, was unelectable,” he said in his victory speech, “let alone in a statewide Senate race in Michigan.” A year earlier to the day, New York had elected Zohran Mamdani as its first Muslim mayor; on 1 January he took the oath on two Qurans, one of them his grandfather’s. In February, one of Britain’s most successful rappers told a livestream audience that he had taken the shahada.
Is Islam getting cool? The question is usually asked half in jest. Taken seriously, it leads somewhere unexpected. What is happening is not new in itself: Western culture has made religions fashionable before. What is new is the direction of travel.
The Old Trick: Gods as Styles
Western culture has a long habit of taking religions in as styles it can enjoy without believing. Buddhism is the clearest case. In 1979 Jon Kabat-Zinn founded Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction at the University of Massachusetts Medical School, carrying contemplative techniques of Buddhist origin into clinical medicine with no requirement to become Buddhist. From the clinic the practice moved into the workplace, through corporate programmes such as Google’s Search Inside Yourself, and then into the phone. Commercial estimates of the meditation-app market in 2024 range from US$172 million to US$647 million, depending on the analyst. The spread of the figures says something in itself: the practice became a product before anyone could agree what the product was.
Catholicism travelled by image. Dolce & Gabbana’s autumn/winter 2013 collection put the gold mosaics of Monreale Cathedral, rosaries and ecclesiastical colour on the runway. On 7 May 2018 Madonna performed “Like a Prayer” at the Met Gala in Catholic-themed couture, opening Heavenly Bodies: Fashion and the Catholic Imagination, which drew 1,659,647 visits, the most of any exhibition in the Metropolitan Museum’s history. Saints became silhouettes; liturgy became spectacle.
Neither case was pure emptiness. Dolce & Gabbana have described their Catholic imagery as an expression of their own faith, and the anthropologist Birgit Meyer has shown that religions are themselves built from images, bodies and senses: aesthetics can constitute a faith as well as hollow it out. But the pattern held in one decisive respect. In both cases the style was handled by the majority, at a distance from the tradition. Buddhism came from far away; Catholicism was a past the secular West had already half left. Nobody had to negotiate with a neighbour.
| Year | Tradition | Event | What travelled | Who handled it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979 | Buddhism | Kabat-Zinn founds MBSR at UMass | Technique into medicine | Clinicians |
| 2000s | Buddhism | Corporate mindfulness, e.g. Google’s Search Inside Yourself | Technique into the workplace | Employers |
| 2013 | Catholicism | Dolce & Gabbana, Monreale collection (AW13) | Mosaics and rosaries into luxury fashion | Designers (who claim faith) |
| 2018 | Catholicism | Met Gala: Madonna, “Like a Prayer” | Liturgy into spectacle | Celebrities |
| 2018 | Catholicism | Heavenly Bodies, Metropolitan Museum | 1,659,647 visits | Museum public |
| 2024 | Buddhism | Meditation-app market: US$172m–647m (estimates) | Practice into product | App companies |
The Reversal: Style With the Believer Inside
The Muslim cool works the other way round. Its authors are, for the most part, believers, and its symbols carry their practice with them. The scholarship saw this first. In Muslim Cool: Race, Religion, and Hip Hop in the United States (2016), Su’ad Abdul Khabeer of the University of Michigan described a way of being Muslim formed where Islam meets hip hop, produced by young Black, Latino, Arab and South Asian American Muslims, with Blackness at its centre. A European literature on Islamic youth culture, gathered in the volume Inventing the Muslim Cool, traced a parallel invention in Western Europe. What has changed since is scale: a UK chart, a global retailer, a US Senate seat.
Fashion shows the reversal plainly. H&M’s 2015 campaign featured the hijab-wearing model Mariah Idrissi. Uniqlo’s collaboration with the designer Hana Tajima reached the UK and US in 2016, putting a Muslim designer in charge of a mass-market line. Nike’s Pro Hijab, on sale from 1 December 2017, was developed for Muslim athletes. Dolce & Gabbana — the same house that had put Monreale on the runway — launched an abaya and hijab collection in 2016 for Muslim customers in the Gulf. The consultancy DinarStandard estimates Muslim consumer spending on modest fashion at US$327 billion in 2023. That figure measures Muslim purchasing power, not adoption by anyone else. Here the majority did not borrow the style; Muslims designed it, wore it and paid for it, and the brands followed.
Music shows it more sharply still. American hip hop carried Islamic language long before the current wave, much of it through Black Muslim artists; that is the lineage Abdul Khabeer documents. In France, Médine’s “Don’t Laïk” (2015) contested exclusionary readings of secularism, from an artist who called himself a musulman laïc. In Britain, Central Cee’s “Doja”, with its line about the mandem celebrating Eid, reached number two on the singles chart in 2022. At the time the line read as the everyday vocabulary of multi-ethnic London. On 7 February 2026, during a livestream, the same artist said he had taken the shahada and changed his first name to Akhil. In the old pattern, faith became slang. Here slang became faith.
The same reversal runs through the smaller forms of the culture. The image at the top of this Dispatch, by the illustrator Barakah Vibe, borrows the nostalgic pop language of a 2000s mobile phone to carry a line of devotion: In the end, it’s just you and Allah. The visual vocabulary is secular and shared; the message is religious and unapologetic. Only one arena shows something like borrowing in the old sense. In Germany, “Yalla” came third in Langenscheidt’s Youth Word of the Year in 2012. That is ordinary, largely secular slang from mixed classrooms, and it is a reminder that Arabic is not Islam.
What connects these cases is a change of posture. An older bargain asked Muslims in Western public life to explain themselves, soften their practice and wait for permission. The people in this record did not wait. A rapper contested French secularism on his own terms. A hijab-wearing model fronted a mass-market campaign. A designer put her name on a global retailer’s collection. An artist declared his faith on a livestream. A mayor who had first played down his religion chose, under attack, to show more of it. In these arenas, the movement is from asking permission to setting the terms.
| Year | Arena | Milestone | Author | First audience |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Music (France) | Médine, “Don’t Laïk” | Muslim artist | French mainstream |
| 2015 | Fashion | H&M campaign with Mariah Idrissi | Brand, with a Muslim model | Mainstream |
| 2016 | Fashion | Uniqlo × Hana Tajima reaches UK and US | Muslim designer | Mainstream and Muslim |
| 2016 | Fashion | Dolce & Gabbana abaya and hijab line | Luxury brand | Muslim (Gulf) |
| 2017 | Sport | Nike Pro Hijab on sale, 1 December | Brand, for Muslim athletes | Muslim athletes |
| 2022 | Music (UK) | Central Cee, “Doja”, UK No. 2 | Artist | Mainstream |
| 2023 | Fashion | Modest-fashion spending: US$327bn (estimate) | Muslim consumers | Muslim |
| 2026 | Music (UK) | Central Cee says he has taken the shahada | Artist | Mainstream |
The Keffiyeh, or the Old Pattern
The clearest proof of the reversal is a symbol that did not reverse. After the war in Gaza began in October 2023, the American distributor of Hirbawi, the last keffiyeh maker in the occupied West Bank, told Reuters that “in two days, the stock that we had was just gone.” The keffiyeh is a political symbol, not a religious one: it signals solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and Palestinians themselves are not all Muslim. Its meaning is also contested; critics, writing in the Jewish Chronicle among other places, read it as a hostile symbol.
Its fashion career follows the old Western pattern almost exactly. As the Ramallah-based writer Salma Mousa noted in Dazed MENA, the pattern has passed through Raf Simons’s runway in 2001, Balenciaga in 2007 and a Louis Vuitton stole priced at $705 in 2021. She calls its absorption into fashion a “representation trap”: a symbol emptied of meaning as it spreads, worn as a gesture in place of commitment. That is the old trick, applied to a political cause.
The contrast is the point. A keffiyeh can be worn by anyone, for a day, and taken off. A hijab worn every day, a fast kept through a working month, a prostration after every goal are harder to empty, because they are not detachable from a life. The symbols of the new Muslim cool resist the representation trap for the same reason they unsettle: they come with obligations attached.
| Dimension | Keffiyeh | Hijab, sujood, shahada |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | Political symbol | Religious practice |
| Who wears or performs it | Anyone, as a sign of solidarity | Believers |
| Can it be taken off? | Yes, after a march or a season | Bound to a daily life |
| Fashion history | Raf Simons 2001; Balenciaga 2007; Louis Vuitton $705 stole 2021 | Muslim designers and buyers: Tajima 2016; US$327bn spending, 2023 |
| Recent demand signal | US stock “gone” in two days, 2023 | Growing modest-fashion market (estimates) |
| Pattern | Old: the symbol empties as it spreads | New: the symbol arrives full |
Why It Unsettles: The State Reads the Belief
If the Muslim cool arrives with the faith attached, the restrictions that accompany it read differently. They are not simply a contradiction. They are the other half of the same recognition.
In France, the Ministry of Education removed abayas and qamis from state schools by memorandum of 31 August 2023. When the Conseil d’État upheld the measure on 27 September 2024, its reasoning turned on conspicuous religious affiliation under the school secularism framework. The court, in other words, refused to treat the garment as a style. It treated it as a belief made visible — precisely what the market prefers not to say. Elsewhere the instruments differ: Switzerland’s ban on face coverings in public came into force on 1 January 2025, with exceptions, and does not cover ordinary headscarves; in May 2025 France’s governing Renaissance party proposed restricting the hijab in public for girls under fifteen, with no enactment recorded; on 4 June 2025 the Reform UK MP Sarah Pochin asked the Prime Minister to ban the burqa, Keir Starmer declined, and Reform’s own chairman criticised the question.
The cost of a symbol that arrives full is measured. In the EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s survey, published in October 2024, 58% of young Muslim women aged 16–24 who wear religious clothing said they had faced discrimination when looking for work in the previous five years, against 38% of those who do not. The comparison is observational and does not isolate clothing as the cause. It does mark where admiration for the style stops: at the point where the person wearing it asks to be employed.
Politics shows the same tension, resolved differently. Mamdani, by his own account to the AP in October 2025, at first played down his Muslim identity and then chose to embrace it after campaign attacks; he won with a young, immigrant coalition organised around the cost of living. His victory was not isolated: according to the Council on American-Islamic Relations, as reported by the Washington Times, 38 of 76 Muslim candidates on the ballot won in November 2025, among them Ghazala Hashmi, elected lieutenant governor of Virginia, the first Muslim woman to win statewide office in the United States. El-Sayed was attacked over his name and religion; according to Al Jazeera, Republican critics called him a “jihadist”. In his victory speech he replied: “They might have been pointing to my name and my faith, but we all know that my name and my faith aren’t the reason you can’t afford your gas.” Neither Mamdani nor El-Sayed concealed his faith. Their victories show that visibly Muslim candidates can win; they do not show that voters embraced Islam, or that Muslim identity was an electoral asset.
Seen this way, the market and the state are not looking at different things. Both see that these symbols carry belief. The market sells to it; the state regulates it. The woman buying a modest dress and the voter supporting a ban are not shown to be the same person. What they share is a recognition the old pattern never required: this time the style cannot be separated from the believer.
| Date | Jurisdiction | Instrument | Measure | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 Aug 2023 | France | School policy | Abaya and qamis removed from state schools | In force |
| 27 Sep 2024 | France | Judicial review | Conseil d’État upholds: conspicuous religious affiliation | Final |
| Oct 2024 | EU (selected states) | Survey (FRA) | Job-search discrimination, women 16–24: 58% with religious clothing, 38% without | Self-reported; not causal |
| 1 Jan 2025 | Switzerland | Federal law | Face-covering ban in public, with exceptions | In force |
| May 2025 | France | Party proposal | No hijab in public for under-15s (Renaissance) | Proposal; no enactment recorded |
| 4 Jun 2025 | United Kingdom | Parliamentary question | Burqa-ban request at PMQs; Prime Minister declines | No measure |
When Admiration Touches Faith
If the style cannot be separated from the believer, admiration for the style should sometimes reach the faith. The best evidence says it does.
In 2021 the political scientists Ala’ Alrababa’h, William Marble, Salma Mousa and Alexandra Siegel published in the American Political Science Review a test of what Salah’s presence did to Liverpool. Recorded hate crime in Merseyside ran about 16% below a synthetic control after his arrival. The share of anti-Muslim tweets among Liverpool fans’ posts about Muslims fell from 7.3% to 3.8%. And in a survey experiment among 8,060 fans, reading about Salah’s religious practice raised agreement that Islam is compatible with British values by about five points, from a baseline of 18%. The outcome concerns the religion, not the player; the prompt was his observance, not his goals.
The limits matter. A 2022 corrigendum lowered the authors’ estimate of the anti-Muslim share of recorded hate crime from about 39% to roughly 4–11%, which makes the crime result a weak proxy. The experiment measured a short-term response among supporters of one club, and a parallel test on Salah’s teammate Sadio Mané found an effect on tweets but none on hate crime. One player is not a law of culture. But the mechanism fits the reversal exactly. Fans did not warm to Islam by buying something. They warmed to it by watching, week after week, a man who would not separate his game from his prayer.
| Outcome | Finding | Design | Caveat |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recorded hate crime, Merseyside | About −16% against synthetic control | Synthetic control, from June 2017 | All hate crime; anti-Muslim share estimated at 4–11% |
| Anti-Muslim tweets, Liverpool fans | 7.3% → 3.8% of Muslim-related tweets | About 15 million tweets | Fan sample only |
| “Islam is compatible with British values” | +5 points on an 18% baseline | Survey experiment, 8,060 fans | Short-term; outcome concerns Islam itself |
| Sadio Mané (comparison) | Effect on tweets; none on hate crime | Same design | Limits generalisation |
A Generation of Believers, and the Limits of the Case
The reversal depends on the producers of the culture being believers, and the generational data point that way. An Ifop telephone survey for the review Écran de Veille (August–September 2025, 1,005 Muslims in metropolitan France) found that 30% of Muslims under 25 described themselves as very or extremely religious, against 12% of those aged 50 and over; the survey was commissioned and its framing contested. A separate British poll, by Savanta for the magazine Hyphen in February 2023, found that 89% of Muslims aged 16–24 pray at home at least sometimes and 68% sometimes visit a mosque, while more than 60% of their non-Muslim peers rarely or never pray or attend worship. On the other side, Pew found in 2019 that in France and Sweden adults over 60 were more than 25 points likelier than those aged 18–34 to view Muslims unfavourably. Young Muslims who appear more observant, young non-Muslims who appear less hostile: a striking configuration, though cross-sectional surveys cannot tell an age effect from a lasting generational one, and these measure different people.
Why commitment might itself carry status is the most interesting question the case raises. In a consumer culture that prizes limitless self-reinvention, a demanding tradition — prayer at fixed times, a month of fasting, a community with claims on its members — may offer what the culture lacks. The idea has a darker variant that must be named: after the influencer Andrew Tate announced his conversion in 2022, a strand of online preaching sold Islam to young men as toughness and male dominance, an overlap with the misogynist “manosphere” that the Iraqi writer Rasha Al Aqeedi analysed in New Lines in January 2023. Discipline can confer status for very different reasons. Stories of religious revival among the young also deserve caution: in March 2026 YouGov withdrew a widely reported study for the Bible Society that had claimed a “quiet revival” of churchgoing among young Britons, after finding fraudulent respondents. And Islam is not one practice: a full account makes room for women who contest dress requirements as well as those who choose them.
Two further limits keep the case honest. The cool is not a conversion wave. Pew’s March 2025 study found that in the thirteen countries where Muslim samples allowed analysis, movements into and out of Islam each amounted to 3% or less of adults; France’s Trajectoires et Origines survey found retention of 91% in Muslim families; and the most cited post-Gaza British study, by the Institute for the Impact of Faith in Life, counted 36 people who had become Muslim and 22 who had left Islam among 2,774 respondents who had changed religion. Nor has anyone shown that cultural status is reaching institutions. The FRA’s figures for Muslims experiencing racial discrimination rose from 39% in 2016 to 47% in 2022, but two survey waves are not a series. Whether the arena’s status travels to the classroom and the hiring office has not been measured.
| Indicator | Result | Source and period |
|---|---|---|
| Muslims under 25 “very or extremely religious” (France) | 30% (12% aged 50+) | Ifop for Écran de Veille, 1,005 Muslims, Aug–Sep 2025; commissioned |
| Muslim women 18–24 who wear the veil, regularly or occasionally (France) | About 1 in 2 | Same; small subsample |
| Muslims 16–24 who pray at home at least sometimes (UK) | 89% | Savanta for Hyphen, 1,002 Muslims, Feb 2023 |
| Muslims 16–24 who sometimes visit a mosque (UK) | 68% | Same |
| Non-Muslims 16–24 who rarely or never pray or attend worship (UK) | More than 60% | Same |
| Gap in unfavourable views of Muslims, 60+ against 18–34 (France, Sweden) | More than 25 points | Pew, 2019 |
| Adults entering or leaving Islam, 13 countries | 3% or less each | Pew, 2025 |
A Precise Answer
So, is Islam getting cool? Yes, in a precise sense, and the sense matters more than the yes. Muslim identity has become visible and, in specific arenas, prestigious. The prestige is largely produced by Muslims themselves. In at least one rigorously studied case it has reached attitudes towards the faith. It has not produced a wave of conversions, and it has not yet been shown to reach the institutions where ordinary Muslims are hired, schooled and governed.
| Meaning of “cool” | Verdict | Key evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Visibility | Yes | Fashion, charts, Ramadan lights |
| Prestige | Yes, in sport and music | Salah chants; Muslim artists in the charts |
| Made by Muslims | Yes, largely | Designers, artists, US$327bn Muslim spending |
| Reaches the faith | Yes, in one rigorous case | Salah experiment, +5 points |
| Imitation by non-Muslims | Unmeasured | No data on buyers’ religion |
| Conversion | No | 3% or less entering or leaving |
| Institutional acceptance | Not shown | School rules; 58% vs 38% in job search |
What makes the answer interesting is the reversal. For a century the West took other people’s gods and wore them lightly: a breathing exercise without the dharma, a rosary without the Mass. The new Muslim cool does not let itself be worn that way. It comes from believers, it carries their practice, and it asks the culture that admires it to accept the faith along with the style. Some of that culture is learning to: a stadium in Liverpool, a chart in London, an electorate in Michigan. Some of it answers with a school rule or a hiring decision. Both responses recognise the same thing.
Whether the admiration travels — from the striker to the schoolgirl, from the arena to the institution — is the question of the coming decade. Until it is answered, the most exact image of the moment is not a garment or a slogan. If anything about Islam is getting cool, it is less a style than a person who prays in public and is cheered for it.
Sources
- Associated Press, Michigan US Senate race call, 4 November 2026; Abdul El-Sayed, victory speech, Detroit, 4 November 2026 (transcript, Rev); The Michigan Daily, 4 November 2026.
- Al Jazeera, 4 November 2026.
- Associated Press, “Zohran Mamdani sworn in as New York City mayor at historic subway station”, 1 January 2026 (via Star Tribune); Mshale, 2 January 2026; Associated Press, 24 October 2025.
- The Washington Times, citing the Council on American-Islamic Relations, 28 November 2025.
- UMass Chan Medical School, history of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (1979); Future Market Insights and Fact.MR, meditation-app market estimates (2024).
- Metropolitan Museum of Art, press release on Heavenly Bodies: Fashion and the Catholic Imagination, 11 October 2018; reporting on the Met Gala, 8 May 2018; review of Dolce & Gabbana autumn/winter 2013, 23 February 2013.
- Birgit Meyer (ed.), Aesthetic Formations: Media, Religion, and the Senses, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Su’ad Abdul Khabeer, Muslim Cool: Race, Religion, and Hip Hop in the United States, NYU Press, 2016 (excerpt, The Immanent Frame); Inventing the Muslim Cool: Islamic Youth Culture in Western Europe, transcript (catalogue record).
- DinarStandard, State of the Global Islamic Economy Report 2024/25, 7 July 2025; Uniqlo press release, 14 June 2016; Nike, Pro Hijab (December 2017); Dolce & Gabbana (2016).
- JOE, 7 February 2026; Official Charts Company, Central Cee, “Doja” (2022); Langenscheidt, Jugendwort des Jahres 2012 (results).
- Reuters, “US sales of Palestinian keffiyehs soar, even as wearers targeted”, 5 December 2023 (via Dawn); Salma Mousa, “Scarf first, politics later”, Dazed MENA; The Jewish Chronicle, opinion.
- French Ministry of National Education, memorandum of 31 August 2023; Conseil d’État, decision of 27 September 2024; Swiss Federal Council, ban on face coverings, in force 1 January 2025; House of Commons, PMQs, 4 June 2025 (GB News; Politics.co.uk).
- EU Fundamental Rights Agency, Being Muslim in the EU, 25 October 2024 (findings, Q&A).
- Ala’ Alrababa’h, William Marble, Salma Mousa and Alexandra Siegel, “Can Exposure to Celebrities Reduce Prejudice?”, American Political Science Review 115(4), 2021; Corrigendum, APSR 116(2), 2022.
- Ifop for Écran de Veille, November 2025; Hyphen (Savanta), 28 March 2023; Pew Research Center, 15 October 2019 and 26 March 2025; INSEE–INED, Trajectoires et Origines 2 (2023); Institute for the Impact of Faith in Life, December 2025.
- Rasha Al Aqeedi, “Andrew Tate and the Moral Bankruptcy of Muslim Proselytization”, New Lines Magazine, 26 January 2023; Christian Post, on YouGov’s withdrawal of the “Quiet Revival” study, March 2026.
- Context
- Abdul El-Sayed's election as the first Muslim US senator (AP call, 4 November 2026), one year after Zohran Mamdani's election as mayor of New York, against continuing restrictions on Muslim dress in France and debate in Britain.
- Causes
- Muslim creators, athletes and politicians gaining mainstream audiences on their own terms; Muslim purchasing power; generational change on both sides; persistent institutional constraints.
- Actors
- Mohamed Salah and Liverpool supporters; Central Cee, Médine; Hana Tajima, Mariah Idrissi, Nike, Uniqlo, Dolce & Gabbana; Zohran Mamdani, Abdul El-Sayed; the French Ministry of Education and Conseil d'État; Reform UK's Sarah Pochin; Pew, FRA, Ifop, IIFL.
- Perspectives
- The reversal of an old Western habit: religions consumed as aesthetics without belief (Buddhism as mindfulness, Catholicism as couture) against a Muslim cool produced by believers, whose symbols arrive with the faith attached.
- Relationships
- Links to Fides (religion and power), Veblen (fashion), Orpheus (music), The Arena (sport beyond sport) and Imperium (law and the state).
