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A worker on an aerial lift sprays blue dust-suppressant onto the corrugated wall of the X-333 process building at the former Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio
Preparing the X-333 process building for demolition at the former Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Pike County, Ohio, May 2025. Image: U.S. Department of Energy, public domain.
Dispatch · II.DP.STRU.01

AI’s Money Loop Concentrates Risk on Few Balance Sheets

Since 2025 the chipmakers and cloud providers that supply OpenAI have repeatedly financed, guaranteed or taken stakes in the customer that buys their capacity. The filings describe an old instrument, vendor financing, used at a scale and in forms the telecom boom never saw. The risk they record sits less in the circle itself than in how few customers stand at its centre.

9 November 2026 · 15 min read

Since 2025 the chipmakers and cloud providers that supply OpenAI have repeatedly financed, guaranteed or taken stakes in the customer that buys their capacity. The filings describe an old instrument, vendor financing, used at a scale and in forms the telecom boom never saw. The risk they record sits less in the circle itself than in how few customers stand at its centre.

In September 2025 Nvidia and OpenAI announced a letter of intent under which Nvidia would invest up to $100 billion in OpenAI progressively as each gigawatt of Nvidia systems was deployed.1 That agreement was never completed. Nvidia’s annual report stated that there was no assurance a transaction would be concluded,2 and in March 2026 its chief executive said the $100 billion deal was probably “not in the cards” and that a $30 billion equity investment made in February “might be the last” before an OpenAI listing.3 The headline number shrank while the structure behind it remained. By August 2026 Nvidia had agreed to guarantee up to $105 billion on leases for an Ohio campus that will host Nvidia systems for OpenAI.4

The pattern is usually called “circular financing”, a phrase that can suggest either fraud or an accounting mirage. The filings support a narrower reading.

The circular financing of artificial intelligence is a disclosed form of vendor financing, smaller in its binding terms than in its announcements, and its principal risk is concentration: a large share of contracted demand rests on a few customers, above all OpenAI, that do not yet earn a profit.

Three tests can falsify that thesis. The first concerns mechanism: if the main arrangements prove to be arm’s-length purchases, with no financing, guarantee or equity flowing from seller to buyer, the “loop” reading fails. The second concerns precedent: if the structure does not match recognised vendor financing such as that of Lucent and Nortel in 1998–2001, the analogy fails, and where it matches in form, the differences in instrument, scale and counterparty must be stated. The third concerns concentration: if the backlogs and revenues of Oracle, Microsoft, CoreWeave, Nvidia and AMD prove diversified across many customers, the risk claim narrows to little.

The Deals as Filed

Exhibit 1 sets out eight arrangements between OpenAI and its suppliers in 2025 and 2026. Five pair a purchase commitment by OpenAI with financing, a guarantee or equity from the seller. Two are purchase contracts with no disclosed financing from the seller. One, the original Nvidia letter of intent, never became binding.

The financing legs take four forms. The first is equity. Nvidia put $30 billion into a funding round of $110 billion that OpenAI announced on 27 February 2026, and the same announcement gave OpenAI three gigawatts of dedicated inference capacity and two gigawatts of training capacity on Nvidia’s Vera Rubin systems. Unlike the 2025 letter, the $30 billion was not tied to deployment milestones.3 Amazon committed $50 billion to the round, $15 billion up front and $35 billion when certain conditions are met, alongside an agreement under which OpenAI will consume two gigawatts of Amazon’s own AI chips. The round valued OpenAI at $840 billion after the new money.5 Microsoft holds an interest of about 24 per cent in OpenAI on an as-converted basis and has made funding commitments of $13.0 billion, of which $12.0 billion had been funded by 30 September 2026. In the quarter to that date it recorded $10.0 billion of revenue from commercial arrangements with OpenAI, including revenue-sharing payments.6 Under the companies’ restructured relationship, OpenAI has set out plans to buy an additional $250 billion of Azure services.7

The second form is the warrant. In October 2025 AMD granted OpenAI a warrant over up to 160 million AMD shares at one cent each. The shares vest in tranches as OpenAI’s purchases rise towards six gigawatts of AMD Instinct GPUs, the first gigawatt due in the second half of 2026, and as AMD’s share price clears targets that end at $600 for the last tranche.89 AMD treats the warrant as consideration payable to a customer: the grant-date fair value of warrant shares probable of vesting is recorded as a reduction of revenue. Remeasuring the warrant liability cost AMD $1.1 billion in the quarter to 26 September 2026.10 AMD granted an identical warrant to Meta in February 2026, and as of 27 June 2026 no warrant shares had vested under either.11

The third form is the guarantee. Nvidia’s guarantees with SB Energy cover leases at the PORTS technology campus in Pike County, Ohio, where an OpenAI affiliate has signed 20-year leases for an initial 4.25 gigawatts. The obligation is capped at $105 billion and Nvidia becomes the campus’s exclusive supplier of AI computing systems, with limited exceptions. The guarantee attaches only to completed buildings. It pays only if OpenAI defaults on a lease or becomes insolvent and SB Energy cannot relet or sell the site on the same terms, and it expires if OpenAI obtains a satisfactory credit rating.412 Including smaller land, power and shell guarantees for other AI cloud partners, Nvidia’s maximum gross exposure under guarantees is $108.5 billion.4

The fourth form is extended credit and capacity support. Nvidia states that it has provided, and may provide, payment terms of 90 days to one year on investment-grade customers’ purchases to assist with large data-centre builds. It also reports $36 billion of commitments under agreements to buy cloud capacity from AI cloud partners.4

The two purchase-only contracts are the largest by headline value. OpenAI agreed to buy about $300 billion of computing capacity from Oracle over roughly five years from 2027, according to the Wall Street Journal; Oracle declined to comment and has not named the customer in its filings.13 CoreWeave’s contracts with OpenAI total up to $22.4 billion across agreements signed in March, May and September 2025.14 Even here the money is not wholly one-way. In the quarter to 31 August 2026 Oracle received $11.4 billion of customer prepayments that included a significant financing component, from customers it does not name.15 In March 2025 CoreWeave issued 9 million of its own shares, valued at $350 million, to a strategic customer it does not name.16

On the first test, the mechanism is present and documented. Suppliers finance, guarantee or take stakes in a buyer that commits to their products. Two qualifications follow from the record. The binding commitments are smaller and more conditional than the announcements: the $100 billion letter of intent gave way to a $30 billion equity investment, and AMD’s warrant transfers shares only against delivered volume. The largest single contract, Oracle’s, carries no disclosed financing from the seller at all.

II · The Engines — Dry Powder

Five of eight OpenAI supply arrangements pair a purchase with seller financing
Main commitments between OpenAI and its suppliers, September 2025 to August 2026, as disclosed by November 2026
Counterparty and dateSeller to OpenAI (financing leg)OpenAI to seller (purchase leg)StatusSource type
Nvidia, Sep 2025Up to $100bn equity, per gigawatt deployedAt least 10 GW of Nvidia systemsLetter of intent; not completedCompany announcement; company filing; press report
Nvidia, Feb 2026$30bn equity in a $110bn round3 GW inference and 2 GW training on Vera RubinAnnouncedPress report
Nvidia and SB Energy, Aug 2026Lease guarantees capped at $105bnOhio campus, initial 4.25 GW, 20-year leases; Nvidia exclusive supplierAttaches as buildings are completedCompany filing; press report
AMD, Oct 2025Warrant over up to 160m AMD shares at $0.01Up to 6 GW of Instinct GPUsNo shares vested at 27 Jun 2026Company announcement; company filing; press report
Microsoft, restructured 2025About 24% stake; $13.0bn committed, $12.0bn fundedAdditional $250bn of Azure services$10.0bn revenue from OpenAI in quarter to 30 Sep 2026Company filing; press report
Amazon, Feb 2026$50bn equity ($15bn up front, $35bn on conditions)2 GW of Amazon AI chipsAnnouncedPress report
Oracle, Sep 2025None disclosedAbout $300bn over about five years from 2027Customer not named in filingsPress report
CoreWeave, Mar–Sep 2025None disclosedUp to $22.4bn across three contractsSignedCompany announcement
Source: Nvidia 10-K (FY2026) and 10-Q (quarter to 26 Jul 2026); AMD 10-Q (quarter to 26 Sep 2026); Microsoft 10-Q (quarter to 30 Sep 2026); Nvidia, OpenAI, AMD and CoreWeave announcements; CNBC; The National; TechRadar; The Next Web; FourWeekMBA; TechCrunch citing the Wall Street Journal · Exhibit 01 · II.DP.STRU.01

An Old Instrument at a New Scale

Vendor financing has a documented history in telecommunications. Between 1998 and 2001 equipment makers lent to the carriers that bought their switches and optical systems. By the end of fiscal 2000 Lucent had entered into agreements to provide up to $8.1 billion in credit or loan guarantees to customers, of which almost $2.1 billion was outstanding. It had agreed to provide up to $2 billion to a single carrier, WinStar. In 2001 Lucent refused to extend a further $90 million loan; after WinStar was forced into bankruptcy, Lucent wrote off $700 million. Lucent made provisions for bad debts to customers of $2.2 billion in 2001 and $1.3 billion in 2002, and successive downgrades left it with a Moody’s rating of Caa1 by November 2002.17 Nortel’s filing for 2000 stated that the competitive environment required Nortel and many of its principal competitors to provide significant amounts of medium- and long-term customer financing, and attributed part of that year’s rise in selling and administrative costs to increased customer financing provisions.18

In form, the AI arrangements match. The supplier extends its balance sheet to a buyer that could not otherwise fund the purchase at the same pace, and the supplier’s sales depend in part on that support. Three differences separate the episodes, and Exhibit 2 sets them out.

The instrument differs. Lucent and Nortel lent money, which a failing borrower does not repay. The AI suppliers mostly buy equity, grant warrants and guarantee leases. Equity loses value when the buyer weakens; a guarantee turns a customer’s default into the supplier’s liability; AMD’s warrant transfers value only after the buyer has taken delivery. Nvidia’s guarantee is also hedged in ways Lucent’s loans were not: it attaches only to finished buildings, it pays only the shortfall after a relet or sale, and OpenAI has agreed to reimburse any payment.12

The scale differs. Lucent’s $8.1 billion of commitments equalled about 24 per cent of its recorded fiscal 2000 revenue of $33.8 billion (computed by Titanica from Lazonick and March).17 Nvidia’s single guarantee cap of $105 billion is about thirteen times Lucent’s entire commitment book (computed by Titanica), and Nvidia reports a further $25 billion of equity investment commitments across its ecosystem.4

The strength of the supplier differs most. Nvidia earned operating income of $117.3 billion in the first half of its fiscal 2027; its maximum gross exposure under all guarantees, $108.5 billion, equalled about 93 per cent of that half-year’s operating income (computed by Titanica from Nvidia’s 10-Q).4 Lucent’s losses fell on a company whose revenue, once it stabilised after 2003, was less than a quarter of its 1999 peak.17 The counterparty also differs in kind. Lucent and Nortel spread their lending across many young carriers. The AI suppliers concentrate theirs on a handful of model developers, and on one more than the rest.

On the second test, the precedent holds in form and fails in proportion. The structure is vendor financing. The leading supplier is far stronger relative to its exposure than Lucent was, which lowers the risk that a single default endangers it. The exposure is also far more concentrated, which raises the cost to each supplier of a default by the customer at the centre.

II · The Engines — Dry Powder

Telecom vendors lent money; AI suppliers take equity, grant warrants and guarantee leases
Selected vendor-financing exposures, telecom equipment 2000–2002 and AI infrastructure 2025–2026
SupplierDateInstrumentAmountRecorded outcome or scale
LucentEnd FY2000Credit and loan guarantees to customersUp to $8.1bn committed; about $2.1bn outstandingCommitments about 24% of FY2000 revenue*; bad-debt provisions $2.2bn (2001) and $1.3bn (2002)
NortelFY2000Medium- and long-term customer financingDescribed as significant; required by competitionCustomer financing provisions raised 2000 SG&A
Nvidia26 Jul 2026Lease guarantees; equity investment commitmentsGuarantees up to $108.5bn; $25bn equity commitmentsGuarantee cap about 93% of H1 FY2027 operating income*
AMD26 Sep 2026Customer warrants, deducted from revenueTwo warrants, up to 160m shares each$1.1bn remeasurement charge in the quarter; no shares vested at 27 Jun 2026
Microsoft30 Sep 2026Equity in customer$13.0bn committed, $12.0bn funded; about 24% interest$10.0bn revenue from OpenAI in the quarter
Source: Lazonick and March (2011); Nortel 10-K405 (FY2000); Nvidia, AMD and Microsoft 10-Q filings; FourWeekMBA. *Computed by Titanica from the cited figures: $8.1bn ÷ $33.8bn; $108.5bn ÷ $117.3bn. Telecom and AI figures measure different instruments and are not additive · Exhibit 02 · II.DP.STRU.01

Who Owes the Backlog

The third test turns on the order books. Exhibit 3 gathers what each supplier discloses or analysts estimate about its largest customer.

Oracle reported remaining performance obligations, its measure of contracted revenue not yet recognised, of $664 billion at 31 August 2026. It expects to recognise about 13 per cent within twelve months, 37 per cent in months 13 to 36 and 34 per cent in months 37 to 60.15 Oracle does not name the customers behind that figure. When S&P Global Ratings lowered Oracle’s rating to BBB-, one notch above speculative grade, on 9 July 2026, it estimated that roughly half of the $638 billion of obligations then on the books was linked to OpenAI; Moody’s has assigned a negative outlook.19 S&P’s figure is an estimate. Oracle’s filing adds a measure of duration on the other side of the ledger: $288 billion of lease commitments, substantially all for data centres, that have not yet commenced and run for fifteen to nineteen years.15

Microsoft gave its own figure. Its commercial backlog reached $625 billion at the end of December 2025, and the company said about 45 per cent of it came from OpenAI.7 Its chief financial officer said the remaining balance had grown 28 per cent, reflecting broad customer demand.20 Applied to the total, 45 per cent is about $281 billion (computed by Titanica). Microsoft has not published an updated OpenAI share of backlog. Its filing does publish a revenue measure: $10.0 billion from commercial arrangements with OpenAI in the quarter to 30 September 2026, about 10.8 per cent of total revenue of $92.3 billion (computed by Titanica from the 10-Q). The same filing identifies OpenAI as a related party and records $7.2 billion owed by OpenAI at that date, up from $6.0 billion three months earlier.6

CoreWeave names no customer in its revenue note. Its largest customer supplied 36 per cent of revenue in the quarter to 30 June 2026, the second 26 per cent and the third 10 per cent; a year earlier one customer supplied 71 per cent.16 CoreWeave reported remaining performance obligations of $103.7 billion and debt of about $35.1 billion at the same date (computed by Titanica from recourse and non-recourse balances in the 10-Q).16 Its OpenAI contracts, at up to $22.4 billion, equal about 22 per cent of those obligations (computed by Titanica; the contract figure is a ceiling, and part may already have been recognised).14

Nvidia’s revenue is spread wider. One direct customer accounted for 16 per cent of revenue in the quarter to 26 July 2026, and five direct customers accounted for between 10 and 22 per cent each of receivables at that date.4 Its concentration on OpenAI is contingent: the $105 billion guarantee cap, which attaches only as the Ohio buildings are finished. AMD’s is prospective. Its remaining performance obligations were $246 million at 26 September 2026, and its OpenAI exposure takes the form of a warrant that vests only on delivered volume.10

On the third test, the concentration claim holds where the balance sheets are most stretched. A single customer accounts for an estimated half of Oracle’s backlog and a disclosed 45 per cent of Microsoft’s at the end of 2025; one customer supplies more than a third of CoreWeave’s revenue. At Nvidia the exposure is diversified in revenue and concentrated in contingent liabilities. At AMD it has not yet arrived.

II · The Engines — Dry Powder

At Oracle, Microsoft and CoreWeave, one customer exceeds a third of revenue or backlog
Largest-customer exposure disclosed or estimated for five AI suppliers, latest available period, 2025–2026
CompanyMeasure and dateLargest customer shareCustomer named?Source type
OracleRemaining performance obligations, $638bn, 31 May 2026About half (OpenAI)By S&P, not by OracleRating agency estimate via press report
MicrosoftCommercial remaining performance obligation, $625bn, 31 Dec 2025About 45% (OpenAI), about $281bn*YesCompany statement via press report
MicrosoftRevenue, quarter to 30 Sep 2026, $92.3bn$10.0bn, about 10.8%* (OpenAI)YesCompany filing
CoreWeaveRevenue, quarter to 30 Jun 202636%; next two 26% and 10%NoCompany filing
CoreWeaveRemaining performance obligations, $103.7bn, 30 Jun 2026OpenAI contracts up to $22.4bn, about 22%*Yes (contracts)Company announcement and filing
NvidiaRevenue, quarter to 26 Jul 202616% (one direct customer)NoCompany filing
AMDRemaining performance obligations, 26 Sep 2026$246m in total; OpenAI warrant unvestedYes (warrant)Company filing
Source: Oracle 10-Q (quarter to 31 Aug 2026); Computing, reporting S&P Global Ratings; TechRadar and FourWeekMBA, reporting Microsoft’s FY2026 Q2 results; Microsoft 10-Q (quarter to 30 Sep 2026); CoreWeave 10-Q (quarter to 30 Jun 2026) and announcement; Nvidia and AMD 10-Q filings. *Computed by Titanica from the cited figures; shares measured against different bases are not comparable across rows · Exhibit 03 · II.DP.STRU.01

The Customer at the Centre

The concentration matters because of the customer’s finances. OpenAI is a private company and publishes no accounts. What is known comes from its own statements, from its counterparties’ filings and from reporting on documents it has shared with investors. Exhibit 4 labels each figure by the type of its source.

Audited statements for 2025, obtained by the writer Ed Zitron and independently verified by the Financial Times, show revenue of $13.07 billion and an operating loss of $20.92 billion; the net loss of $38.5 billion included a $41.55 billion loss on changes in the fair value of convertible interests and warrant liabilities.21 For 2026, the Wall Street Journal reported in August that OpenAI told investors its revenue was $5.7 billion in the first quarter and $6.7 billion in the second, while its operating loss, including stock-based compensation, widened from $9.3 billion to $12.3 billion.22 Revenue rose about 18 per cent between the quarters; the operating loss rose about 32 per cent (computed by Titanica). In October the Financial Times, followed by Reuters, reported that OpenAI had told investors its annualised revenue for September was almost $50 billion, below the figure approaching $70 billion it had signalled at an earlier investor event.23

Against that revenue stand the commitments. In November 2025 Sam Altman, OpenAI’s chief executive, wrote that the company was looking at commitments of about $1.4 trillion over the next eight years.24 Spread evenly, that is about $175 billion a year, some three and a half times the annualised revenue OpenAI reported to investors for September 2026 (illustrative, computed by Titanica; actual commitments are back-loaded, partly conditional and may have changed since). The gap has been funded with equity, including the $110 billion round of February 2026, a large part of it from the suppliers themselves.5

II · The Engines — Dry Powder

OpenAI’s reported operating loss grew faster than its reported revenue in 2026
OpenAI revenue, losses, run-rate and commitments, 2025–2026, by type of source
MeasurePeriodFigureSource type
Revenue2025$13.07bnPress report of leaked audited accounts
Operating loss2025$20.92bnPress report of leaked audited accounts
RevenueQ1 2026 / Q2 2026$5.7bn / $6.7bn (+18%*)Press report (WSJ)
Operating lossQ1 2026 / Q2 2026$9.3bn / $12.3bn (+32%*)Press report (WSJ)
Annualised revenueSeptember 2026Almost $50bnPress report (FT, Reuters)
Compute commitmentsAbout eight years from Nov 2025About $1.4tnCompany statement
Commitments per year vs run-rateIllustrativeAbout $175bn a year, about 3.5 times $50bn*Computed by Titanica (illustrative)
Microsoft revenue from OpenAIQuarter to 30 Sep 2026$10.0bnCounterparty filing
Source: Quartz, reporting accounts obtained by Ed Zitron and verified by the FT; Outlook Business, reporting the Wall Street Journal; KSL, carrying Reuters and the FT; TechCrunch, reporting Sam Altman; Microsoft 10-Q. *Computed by Titanica from the cited figures; the commitment ratio is illustrative and not a measured result · Exhibit 04 · II.DP.STRU.01

What the Supervisors See

The official assessments published since September converge on the same reading. The IMF, presenting its Global Financial Stability Report in October 2026, reviewed 14 such transactions since 2023 and found about $300 billion of equity investment and $650 billion of debt in exchange for $1.4 trillion of future revenue commitments. That $1.4 trillion is a sum across the 14 deals and a different measure from OpenAI’s own commitments, although the two overlap. The Fund warned that if a recipient company struggles, revenue forecasts and valuations could fall together, weakening the debt tied to the deals.25 An accompanying IMF technical note observed that the current cycle “was anchored by highly profitable incumbent firms with strong balance sheets”, while investment is becoming “increasingly reliant on external financing”, and that circular arrangements “further connect equity investment, debt financing, and future revenue commitments”.26

The Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee reached a parallel judgement at its meeting on 25 September 2026. It recorded that equity valuations for AI companies fell sharply in July, cited a Morgan Stanley estimate that global AI-related debt issuance had reached about $450 billion by early September, more than double the 2025 total, and noted that “circular arrangements” associated with this financing, combined with opacity, could make risks harder to assess and “could amplify losses if expectations disappoint”.27

The rating agencies have applied the same logic to single companies. S&P’s downgrade of Oracle cited mounting debt and sharply negative cash flow, and named OpenAI as the source of roughly half its contracted backlog.19 In both readings, the supervisors locate the risk where the third test locates it: in exposure to a small number of counterparties whose ability to pay depends on revenue not yet earned.

The Case That Concentration Will Dissolve

The strongest counter-argument holds that vendor financing is a normal commercial tool whose money ends in real data centres serving real users. It adds that demand is broad and accelerating: Microsoft’s backlog excluding OpenAI grew 28 per cent, Nvidia’s largest direct customer supplies only 16 per cent of its revenue, and Anthropic’s quarterly revenue overtook OpenAI’s in 2026. As revenue grows across many buyers, it concludes, the concentration on one customer will dissolve.

Much of this the record supports. The suppliers at the core of the loop are profitable and well capitalised, as the IMF technical note states.26 Microsoft’s non-OpenAI backlog is growing.20 Anthropic reported quarterly revenue of $11.6 billion in the second quarter of 2026, ahead of OpenAI for the first time.22 A diversified market of model developers is forming.

What the record does not yet support is the conclusion. Concentration dissolves when the large customer’s share falls, and at the most exposed suppliers that fall has not been shown: Oracle’s backlog grew from $638 billion to $664 billion in the quarter to August with no disclosure of a lower OpenAI share, and CoreWeave’s largest customer still supplies more than a third of revenue.1516 Dissolution also requires the customer at the centre to grow into its commitments, and in the two quarters for which figures have been reported, OpenAI’s operating loss grew faster than its revenue.22 The counter-argument describes a plausible future. The filings describe the present.

Where the Risk Sits

The money loop of artificial intelligence is real, and it is disclosed. AMD deducts its warrants from revenue, Nvidia states the maximum exposure of its guarantees, and Microsoft identifies OpenAI as a related party and reports the revenue it earns from it. The loop is also smaller in its binding terms than in its announcements: the $100 billion that began the story became $30 billion of equity and a guarantee that attaches only to finished buildings.

Read together, the filings show where the exposure lands. It lands on balance sheets that carry long leases against shorter contracts and rely on one customer for a large part of their future revenue: Oracle’s most heavily, and CoreWeave’s. It lands on Microsoft through a stake, a receivable and a backlog. It lands contingently on Nvidia as the Ohio buildings are completed. It lands on that customer’s investors, among them the same suppliers. The three tests leave the thesis standing in a narrower form than the phrase “circular financing” implies. The instrument is old and the concentration is new, and the outcome for several of the largest balance sheets in technology now depends on whether one unprofitable company grows into what it has promised to buy.

  1. NVIDIA and OpenAI, “OpenAI and NVIDIA Announce Strategic Partnership to Deploy 10 Gigawatts of NVIDIA Systems”, 22 September 2025 (company announcement). https://investor.nvidia.com/news/press-release-details/2025/OpenAI-and-NVIDIA-Announce-Strategic-Partnership-to-Deploy-10-Gigawatts-of-NVIDIA-Systems/default.aspx (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  2. NVIDIA Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 25 January 2026 (company filing). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581026000021/nvda-20260125.htm (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  3. Ashley Capoot, CNBC, “Nvidia CEO Huang says $30 billion OpenAI investment ‘might be the last'”, 4 March 2026 (press report). https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/04/nvidia-huang-openai-investment.html (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  4. NVIDIA Corporation, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 26 July 2026 (company filing). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001045810/000104581026000075/nvda-20260726.htm (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  5. The National, “OpenAI raises $110bn in investment as AI boom accelerates”, 27 February 2026 (press report). https://www.thenationalnews.com/future/technology/2026/02/27/openai-raises-110bn-in-investment-as-ai-boom-accelerates (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  6. Microsoft Corporation, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026 (company filing). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000789019/000119312526436133/msft-20260930.htm (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  7. TechRadar, “‘We are pushing the frontier across our entire AI stack’: Microsoft’s latest results show new cloud and AI returns, but reliance on OpenAI causes concerns”, 29 January 2026 (press report). https://www.techradar.com/pro/we-are-pushing-the-frontier-across-our-entire-ai-stack-microsofts-latest-results-show-new-cloud-and-ai-returns-but-reliance-on-openai-causes-concerns (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  8. OpenAI and AMD, “AMD and OpenAI announce strategic partnership to deploy 6 gigawatts of AMD GPUs”, 6 October 2025 (company announcement). https://openai.com/index/openai-amd-strategic-partnership/ (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  9. Vested Finance, “OpenAI can buy 160 million shares of trillion-dollar AMD at just 1 cent each. How?”, 2026 (commentary). https://vestedfinance.com/blog/us-stocks/openai-can-buy-160-million-shares-of-trillion-dollar-amd-at-just-1-cent-each-how/ (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  10. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 26 September 2026 (company filing). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000002488/000000248826000191/amd-20260926.htm (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  11. FourWeekMBA, “AMD’s First Warrant Charge Is $1.1B, 39% of Operating Profit”, 2026 (press report citing AMD’s 10-Q for the quarter ended 27 June 2026). https://fourweekmba.com/ai-amds-first-warrant-charge-is-1-1b-39-of-operating-profit/ (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  12. The Next Web, “Nvidia is not backing OpenAI’s rent. It is backing the buildings”, August 2026 (press report). https://thenextweb.com/news/nvidia-openai-ports-pike-105bn-residual-value-guarantee (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  13. TechCrunch, “OpenAI and Oracle reportedly ink historic cloud computing deal”, 10 September 2025 (press report citing the Wall Street Journal). https://techcrunch.com/2025/09/10/openai-and-oracle-reportedly-ink-historic-cloud-computing-deal/ (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  14. CoreWeave, “CoreWeave Expands Agreement with OpenAI by up to $6.5B”, 25 September 2025 (company announcement). https://www.coreweave.com/news/coreweave-expands-agreement-with-openai-by-up-to-6-5b (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  15. Oracle Corporation, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 31 August 2026 (company filing). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001341439/000119312526389274/orcl-20260831.htm (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  16. CoreWeave, Inc., Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 June 2026 (company filing). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1769628/000176962826000366/crwv-20260630.htm (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  17. William Lazonick and Edward March, “The Rise and Demise of Lucent Technologies”, Business and Economic History On-Line, Business History Conference, 2011 (peer-reviewed). https://thebhc.org/sites/default/files/lazonickandmarch.pdf (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  18. Nortel Networks Corporation, Form 10-K405 for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2000 (company filing). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000072911/000095014401003499/t26083ke10-k405.txt (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  19. Computing, “Oracle under pressure after ratings downgrade over AI expansion”, July 2026 (press report of an S&P Global Ratings action). https://www.computing.co.uk/news/2026/ai/oracle-under-pressure-after-ratings-downgrade-over-ai-expansion (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  20. FourWeekMBA, “Microsoft’s $625B Commercial Backlog: 45% from OpenAI”, January 2026 (press report of Microsoft’s fiscal 2026 second-quarter earnings call). https://fourweekmba.com/microsofts-625b-commercial-backlog-45-from-openai (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  21. Quartz, “OpenAI’s leaked financials reveal soaring losses as it prepares to go public”, updated 3 July 2026 (press report of audited accounts obtained by Ed Zitron and verified by the Financial Times). https://qz.com/openai-leaked-financials-losses-revenue-ipo-061626 (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  22. Outlook Business, “OpenAI Trails Anthropic In Q2 Revenue As Growth Slows And Losses Deepen”, 19 August 2026 (press report citing the Wall Street Journal). https://www.outlookbusiness.com/deeptech/openai-trails-anthropic-in-q2-revenue-as-growth-slows-and-losses-deepen (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  23. Jaspreet Singh and Krystal Hu, Reuters, via KSL, “OpenAI’s September annualized revenue nears $50 billion, less than previously indicated, source says”, 8 October 2026 (press report, following the Financial Times). https://www.ksl.com/article/51634189/openais-annualized-revenue-20-billion-less-than-previously-signaled-ft-reports (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  24. TechCrunch, “Sam Altman says OpenAI has $20B ARR and about $1.4 trillion in data center commitments”, 6 November 2025 (press report of a company statement). https://techcrunch.com/2025/11/06/sam-altman-says-openai-has-20b-arr-and-about-1-4-trillion-in-data-center-commitments/ (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  25. International Monetary Fund, “Global Financial Markets Face Rising Risks from AI, Bond Yields and Cyberattacks”, IMF Blog, 12 October 2026 (official). https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2026/10/12/global-financial-markets-face-rising-risks-from-ai-bond-yields-and-cyberattacks (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  26. Yingyuan Chen, Deepali Gautam and Jason J. Wu, “The AI Ecosystem: Structure, Financing, and Financial Stability Considerations”, IMF Technical Notes and Manuals, October 2026 (official). https://www.imf.org/en/publications/tnm/issues/2026/10/06/the-ai-ecosystem-structure-financing-and-financial-stability-considerations-579504 (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
  27. Bank of England, “Financial Policy Committee Record – September 2026”, meeting of 25 September 2026, published 30 September 2026 (official). https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-policy-committee-record/2026/september-2026 (accessed 9 November 2026). ↩︎
Read through the Method
Context
Written in November 2026, after a year of supplier-financed AI compute deals and as the IMF and the Bank of England flagged circular arrangements in AI financing. Draws on company filings for quarters ending between June and September 2026.
Causes
Model developers need compute faster than their revenue or credit standing can fund it, so suppliers with strong balance sheets extend equity, warrants, guarantees and prepayment structures to sustain demand for their own products.
Actors
OpenAI as the central customer; Nvidia, AMD, Microsoft, Amazon, Oracle and CoreWeave as suppliers and financiers; S&P, Moody's, the IMF and the Bank of England as assessors of the risk.
Perspectives
Tests the thesis against three falsifiers (mechanism, telecom precedent, customer concentration) and sets out the case that concentration will dissolve as demand broadens, which the record partly supports.
Relationships
Opens the Dry Powder Domain. Related Domains already online: The Firm (Berkshire Kept Buffett’s Rules and Changed the Judge) and Lumière (Netflix Is Selling the Same Hours for More).

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